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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-001

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16 January 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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ETHIOPIA

DPRK Ambassador on Nuclear Proliferation

EA2812194091 Addis Ababa ENA in English
1503 GMT 28 Dec 91

[Text] Addis Ababa, 28 Dec (ENA)—Unlike the situations developing in other parts of the world, the danger of nuclear war is still prevailing on the Korean peninsula. This was stated by Mr. Sok Tae-uk, ambassador of the DPRK to Ethiopia during a press conference he gave here yesterday [27 December] to journalists at the embassy of the DPRK.

Mr. Sok Tae-uk said that when signs of detente are seen presently in many parts of the world, the demand for removing the danger of nuclear war and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is highly voiced. He went on to state that the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is directly related to the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea by the USA, adding that the USA has already deployed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea. Regarding the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, the

ambassador noted: The government of DPRK is striving to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone that will help ensure peace within the peninsula.

Mr. Sok Tae-uk disclosed that last September the USA recognized the existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, and South Korea has also declared denuclearization, adding that under these circumstances unilateral nuclear inspection is contrary to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to the principle of impartiality of international law. For the simultaneous inspections to be conducted, the talks between the DPRK and USA should be held, at which both shall consult over the issue of removing the nuclear threat against the DPRK, Mr. Sok Tae-uk elaborated.

Referring to the reunification of the two Koreas, the ambassador of the DPRK stressed that his country will continue to push with its peace initiative, provided the US Government removes its nuclear weapons from South Korea. Mr. Sok Tae-uk pointed out that he was optimistic that the two Koreas will soon be reunited through the will of the peoples of the two Koreas.

Nuclear Cooperation Accord Signed With Pakistan*OW3112084691 Beijing XINHUA in English
0828 GMT 31 Dec 91*

[Text] Beijing, December 31 (XINHUA)—China and Pakistan signed a contract for nuclear power co-operation here today, according to which China will export a 300,000-kilowatt nuclear power plant to Pakistan.

Jiang Xinxiong, general manager of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and Ishfaq Ahmad, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, signed the contract here at noon.

Chinese Premier Li Peng attended the signing ceremony after he met with the Pakistan delegation in Beijing to attend the ceremony.

According to a CNNC official, the co-operative project was decided in principle by the prime ministers of China and Pakistan in November 1989, and final agreement was reached after many times of friendly discussions between the economic and technological experts of the two countries.

The recent 23rd meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress Standing Committee reviewed and ratified China's participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Li Peng told the Pakistan delegation during their meeting.

The contract is a new content of economic and technological co-operation between China and Pakistan, Li said. "It is totally for peaceful purposes" and will promote the economic growth of Pakistan and benefit the Pakistan people by developing nuclear energy, he noted.

Li said that the two sides have agreed that the project will be secured by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Li also expressed the belief that the project would be a success with the common efforts of Chinese and Pakistan engineers and technicians.

Minister of State of Pakistan A.G.H. Qazi, who is head of the Pakistan delegation, conveyed the regards of Pakistan Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif to Li Peng and thanked Li for his concern about the project.

Qazi reiterated that the construction of the nuclear power plant is totally for peaceful uses.

He said that he is pleased to know that China's Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant is a success and he believed that the plant in Pakistan would also succeed.

Spokesman 'Optimistic' on Signing NPT*OW2012075291 Tokyo KYODO in English 0741 GMT
20 Dec 91*

[Text] Beijing, Dec. 20 KYODO—China is likely to vote next week in favor of signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [NPT] at a meeting of the National People's Congress's Standing Committee, a committee spokesman said Friday.

Spokesman Zhou Chengkui told a press conference that he is personally very optimistic about passage of the bill through the committee which will begin a weeklong session Monday.

The Chinese Government in August told former Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu that China would sign the treaty, and also promised U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in November to finish the domestic procedure to sign the treaty by the end of the year.

The Standing Committee's previous session in October carried over the bill after the session failed to vote on it because of unfulfilled discussion.

Zhou said that although there are some unsatisfactory points in the treaty, all members of the committee are in favor of its basic concepts, nonproliferation, reduction of nuclear weapons and peaceful use of nuclear power.

Successful Domestic LIS Technique Discussed*92P60065E Beijing KEJI RIBAO [SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DAILY] in Chinese 4 Nov 91 p 2*

[Article by Li Tao [2621 2711] and Xie Yanhua [6200 5333 5478]: "Experiment in Collecting Macroscopic Quantities of Uranium Isotope via Laser Separation Succeeds"]

[Summary] Scientists from the Ministry of Nuclear Industry's [i.e. China National Nuclear Corporation's] Institute of Physical and Chemical Engineering (IPCE) and from the CAS Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOFM) have successfully carried out an experiment in collection of macroscopic quantities of U-235 via laser isotope separation (LIS). The scientists achieved a collection rate of over 2 mg/hr of uranium with a 3 percent U-235 enrichment. The experiment proves the feasibility of moving from research on the principles of uranium LIS to the engineering stage. Since 1989, IPCE has conducted experiments on two-step and three-step enrichment of enriched, natural, and depleted uranium; using a domestically made laser system and separator system IPCE has produced uranium with a U-235 enrichment of over 95 percent as indicated by mass spectrometer signals, and have achieved a maximum enrichment factor of over 2,000.

Additional Details on Domestic LIS Technique

92P60077F Beijing ZHONGGUO KEXUE BAO
[CHINESE SCIENCE NEWS] in Chinese 15 Nov 91
p 1

[Article by Zhu Xuhui [6175 2485 6540]: "Experiment To Collect Macroscopic Quantity of Enriched Uranium Succeeds"]

[Summary] Beijing (ZHONGGUO KEXUE BAO report)—Scientists from the China National Nuclear Corporation's Institute of Physical and Chemical Engineering (IPCE) recently carried out a successful experiment at the CAS Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOFM): they used a domestically developed copper-vapor laser isotope separation (LIS) technique to produce uranium with a U235 enrichment of over 3 percent; the collection rate was over two mg/hr, and the one-time collected amount exceeded five mg. The experiment employed a copper-vapor-laser oscillation and amplification system developed in a five-year effort by SIOFM scientists and a separator system developed by IPCE scientists. The experiment indicates that Chinese LIS research and development can take its place in the world's front ranks.

Daya Bay Nuclear Plant Trial Run Successful

HK0601091592 Hong Kong AFP in English 0858 GMT
6 Jan 92

[Excerpt] Beijing, Jan 6 (AFP)—The nuclear power plant at Daya Bay in China has successfully tested one of its turbogenerators, a Western expert said Monday.

Built by the Anglo-French group GEC Alsthom in southern China, the turbine in the number one unit was linked to the main grid for a short while and produced 23 megawatts of electricity Thursday.

The power plant, which has two nuclear reactors capable of producing 900 megawatts, has been plagued by delays in construction which have put back the start up date of the number one unit by one year to the summer of 1993. [passage omitted]

The Chinese-built nuclear plant at Qinshan, 100 kilometres (60 miles) outside Shanghai in eastern China, came on line in December, but can only produce 10 percent of its 300 megawatt capacity.

The authorities have said it will be up to full power within six months, but technicians at the site say it could take a year.

Nuclear power plants in the West are normally capable of full production after three or four months.

Sichuan To Make Nuclear Power Components

HK1412024791 Hong Kong ZHONGGUO TONGXUN
SHE in Chinese 0639 GMT 13 Dec 91

[Text] Beijing, 13 Dec (ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE)—China recently started building its first production line for components of large nuclear power stations.

The construction of this production line will proceed according to the contract signed between the Chinese Atomic Energy Industrial Corporation and the French Cogema Company on introducing technology. This production line will be used to manufacture fuel units for nuclear reactors and the relevant components. With the two governments' approval, the contract formally came into effect 14 October.

This project is being carried out in the Sichuan Nuclear Power Parts Factory. According to the contract, the French company has transferred the design and manufacturing technologies for 900,000 kw water-compressed reactor units, to transform the existing production line so that it will reach advanced international standards of the 1980's.

This production line will go into operation by the end of 1993. It will provide the Guangdong Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station with standard and good-quality nuclear power components.

Column Cites 'Peaceful' Nuclear Assistance

HK3012112291 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO
in Chinese 30 Dec 91 p 1

["New Talk" column: "Numerous International Nuclear Issues Emerge at Year End"]

[Text] News on nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms came hard on the heels of one another shortly before the end of 1991, attracting attention from various circles.

Yesterday alone saw three such relevant news items. One was that the Chinese National People's Congress adopted the resolution approving the State Council's request for joining the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." The second, originated from Pakistan's capital, concerned a story that China will sign in Beijing tomorrow, the last day of this year, an agreement with Pakistan to assist Pakistan in building atomic power plants by offering nuclear technology. The third item was that U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney accused the former Soviet republics of continuing to manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons after independence, and this was unacceptable to the United States; it revealed that nuclear expert teams will be sent to Russia and three other Soviet republics, all of which possess nuclear weapons, to study the implementation of the "treaty on U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reductions."

With the above events, the South Korea-North Korea talks for making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, the yet-to-be resolved problem of international

verification, and the German foreign minister's proposal yesterday for holding arms cut talks with the purpose of eliminating the strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union—people realize that despite the momentous changes over the last year or two, nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons are still important issues in the current international situation.

The "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" is an international treaty of universal binding power on arms cuts and arms control, was signed in 1968, became effective in 1970, and now boasts over 140 signatory states.

Twenty-seven years ago—1964—China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb and became the only Third World country to possess nuclear weapons, and has been continually developing peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology for the last few decades. However, as everybody knows, when the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" went into effect, China was isolated from the United Nations, and the Taiwan authorities had signed and approved the treaty under the name of China. Therefore, it is only a normal response that China did not join the treaty. In recent years, Western nuclear powers have repeatedly invited China to join the treaty. It was only with this background, plus the new developments on the international scene, that China has initiated the legal proceedings for signing the treaty. It was reported that when China officially joins the treaty next year, it will declare that Taiwan's previous signing and approval are all illegal and therefore invalid.

Joining the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" does not mean that China will cease to assist Third World countries in peaceful exploitation of nuclear technology. China has yet to publish the news on

signing relevant agreements with Pakistan. But if this is true, then obviously China is making a clear distinction between the two uses of nuclear energy, and this will contrast sharply [as published] with its support for making both the South and North sides of the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. If some countries reasoned that China must cease to assist Third World countries in developing nongovernmental nuclear energy technological exchanges because it has joined the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," they would be making an "overstretched" demand. Perhaps China preparing to join the treaty on the one hand and signing an agreement with Pakistan on the other was intended to serve as a response to such demands.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the problem that now has all the U.S. attention is the centralized control of nuclear weapons. The Yeltsin-led Russian Republic has failed to secure in its hands all the nuclear weapons that are spread out in four republics. Moreover, Ukraine and Kazakhstan Republics, the two republics that have nuclear arms on their lands, are prepared to hold onto their nuclear weapons and will bring this up again at the Minsk meeting today and tomorrow. It does seem that Cheney has chosen this time to release his statements for the purpose of exerting an immediate influence on the Minsk meeting, apart from long-term consideration.

There have also been reports from Western media that experts working in the former Soviet aerospace industries may all seek outside employers because of political dissolution and economic difficulties. Whether these former Soviet nuclear experts will act in the manner of "every man for himself" and effect a trend of "personal nuclear proliferation" or seek sanctuaries in the West or in some weak but financially powerful and ambitious countries is also a new issue in the international community.

JAPAN

Firm Buys Uranium Ore From Australia, Canada

OW2012132691 Tokyo KYODO in English 1238 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Text] Fukuoka, Dec. 20 KYODO—Kyushu Electric Power Co. announced Friday it has purchased a total of 3,850 short tons of uranium ore concentrate, known as yellow cake, from Australia and Canada at the price of about 18 billion yen.

This brings the total amount of uranium ore concentrate the firm has secured to 12,500 short tons, nearly equivalent to the amount of yellow cake necessary to fuel a total of six atomic power plants up to the year 2000.

The company is now operating four atomic power plants—two at Genkai in Saga Prefecture and two at Sendai in Kagoshima Prefecture.

The company has two more atomic power plants under construction in Genkai. One plant is scheduled to go into operation in March 1994 and the other in July 1997.

When the two new plants start operation, the firm estimated it will require a total of 12,800 short tons of yellow cake for operation up to the year 2000.

Yellow cake is the raw material used to make nuclear fuel used in atomic power plants.

USSR Scientist Views Nuclear Research Issues

OW1612134591 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1210 GMT 16 Dec 91

["Interview" with Garidanskiy, director of the USSR Nuclear Physic Research Institute, by unidentified reporter from "NHK News 21" program; place and date not given—recorded; Garidanskiy speaks in Russian with simultaneous Japanese translation in subtitles; processed from Japanese]

[Text] Our reporter has interviewed Garidanskiy, director of the USSR Nuclear Physic Research Institute.

[Garidanskiy] The most important thing is to designate a person who will assume responsibility for controlling nuclear weapons. Gorbachev is the most desirable person to assume such responsibility because he has made a great contribution to world peace, and his contribution is rated highly around the world. The Soviet Union should not unilaterally dismantle nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union and the United States should cooperate with each other in their dismantling. If the Soviet Union unilaterally dismantles nuclear weapons, this would be unequal. Any unilateral dismantling of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union will certainly hurt the pride of the Soviet people and will provoke objection to such dismantling.

NORTH KOREA

Envoy in Moscow Meets Reporters on Nuclear Issue

SK2712060891 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1500 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] A news conference was held at the DPRK Embassy in Moscow on 25 December in connection with the Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement dated 22 December. Reporters from newspapers, news agencies, and broadcasting media in Moscow participated in it.

Son Song-pil, ambassador of our country, spoke at the news conference.

He referred to the content of the DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, he said that the statement comprehensively sets forth the government's position of the government of the Republic as to the issue of signing a nuclear safeguards agreement, the issue of nuclear inspection, and the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula under the present situation. He stated that through the 25 November Foreign Ministry statement, we had already welcomed the proposal of the U.S. President on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons and said that we will sign a nuclear safeguards agreement if the United States begins to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Noting that after we had issued this statement, foreign press spread reports that the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons began in South Korea and that on 18 December the South Korean person in authority announced that no nuclear weapons exist in South Korea, he said that if this is true it ought to be welcomed for it means that the consistent demand of the government has been realized, stressing that this constitutes a great victory of our nation which has resolutely struggled in calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the removal of nuclear danger.

He said that our country joined the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty with an objective of eliminating the danger of nuclear war in our country and of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and called attention to the fact that the government made various just proposals one after another thereafter, such as the proposal for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, to realize this objective.

He then said that even after we had joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the United States demanded our unilateral implementation of the duty provided for in the treaty instead of withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea, thereby creating such a complicated problem as is seen today.

He noted that under the condition where the United States, the owner of the nuclear weapons who directly has the right to use and the right to withdraw the nuclear

weapons presently deployed in South Korea, has not made any official notification or announcement on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to know exactly whether the nuclear weapons have been withdrawn or not from the foreign press report or by the South Korean person in authority's remarks alone.

He stressed that we proclaimed, nevertheless, now that it has been disclosed that there is no nuclear weapons in South Korea, we will sign the safeguards agreement pursuant to the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty on the premise that the United States will clarify its clear position and that we will subject ourselves to the inspection through a relevant procedure.

He made it clear that he stresses once again that the inspection to ascertain the existence of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea must also be conducted simultaneously when our country receives the inspection pursuant to the nuclear safeguards agreement, as we have already asserted and as the South Korean side has also agreed to it.

He noted that to conduct a simultaneous inspection, it is self-evident that DPRK-U.S. negotiations should be realized. Then the ambassador answered the questions posed by reporters.

Delegates' First Contact on Nuclear Issue Cited

SK2612161391 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 1404 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] The first round of contacts between delegates to discuss the nuclear issue in accordance with the agreement of the fifth round of North-South high-level talks was held on 26 December at Tongilgak on our side of Panmunjom.

Two delegates from each side of the North-South high-level talks and three experts from each side participated. The meeting was held behind closed doors.

After the end of the meeting, our side's delegate Choe U-chin held a news conference.

He said that today's meeting is the first since the adoption of the agreement on reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation and exchange between the North and South at the fifth round of North-South high-level talks; it dealt with the nuclear issue, which is a life-and-death matter for the nation; and it was especially important.

He revealed that complete agreement was reached on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Our side showed sincerity and tolerance so that a joint declaration could be signed and adopted at the sixth round of high-level talks, putting forth a fresh draft of a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, taking into great consideration the South side's proposals.

According to our side's proposal, the title itself shows that our side accepted the South side's claims so that a breakthrough can be made in resolving the nuclear issue. Also, many subjects, including issues related to the nuclear umbrella and prohibiting passing, landing, and calling of aircraft and warships with nuclear weapons in the sky and territorial waters—which the South side finds difficult to accept—were eliminated and revised.

Also, in our new joint draft the point that nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities will not be maintained, which the South side is claiming, is clearly written. Regarding this kind of new proposal by our side, the South side assessed this as a proposal showing change.

Nevertheless, in contrast to our side, in today's meeting the South side put forth a so-called joint declaration that was identical to the one put forth during the fifth round of North-South high-level talks and made unreasonable and arrogant remarks by saying that our side must sign and ratify the nuclear safeguards accord by a certain time, and other remarks.

Moreover, the South side said that if we do not sign and ratify the nuclear safeguards accord, our side will have to take some kind of responsibility. With regard to this, our side asked if the purpose of the South side's participation in today's contact is to resolve the nuclear issue or to obtain something else by threatening us, and strongly questioned the South side's motives and position in dealing with the talks.

Our side responded that the South side's words and deeds are indeed unjust, improper, and lacking common sense and run counter to the spirit of the agreement adopted between the North and South.

Our side clearly revealed that signing, ratification, and inspection, issues the South side put forth, are issues that must be resolved between our side and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and that these are by no means issues in which the South side should interfere.

With regard to our side's position, our side clearly stated that we are sincerely fulfilling the duty of the IAEA and that we will in the near future sign the nuclear safeguards accord and ratify it through legal procedures and also receive inspections.

Our side said that the whole world knows that some 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea and counters with the question: Why is the South side not making a single remark regarding this matter, and why is it so afraid of clearly writing in the joint declaration the articles prohibiting passage, landing, and calling of aircraft and warships with nuclear weapons in the sky and territorial waters?

We said that we welcome it because the person in authority in South Korea confirmed that U.S. nuclear weapons no longer exist in the South. However, we asked

why the United States, which has the right to produce, deploy, use, and receive nuclear weapons, keeps silent.

We stressed that it is our belief and will that we never obey or yield to anyone's pressures and deal with and solve all of our problems independently. The South side is distorting the fact as if the problem lies in our refusal to sign the nuclear safeguards accord in guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula. We noted that the real problem is that the South side keeps conducting the joint Team Spirit military exercises, which is a nuclear war game.

We urged the South side to answer the question of how it can conduct the Team Spirit exercise next year under the pretext of a possible southward invasion at this time, when a good agreement promising nonaggression between the North and the South is adopted. The South side admitted that the signing, ratification, and inspection surely are questions to be solved between the North side and the IAEA. However, reiterating the previous allegations that the Team Spirit exercises are not for the purpose of northward invasion but are defensive exercises, the South side avoided giving a clear answer.

Our side's delegates logically refuted the South side's recent statements on the signing, ratification, and other topics which are aimed at finding new excuses to enforce the planned nuclear war game at this time when the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation, and Exchange Between the North and the South is adopted and there are no more excuses for the exercises.

Saying that it will decisively affect the sixth round of the North-South high-level talks and that the peace-loving people of the world will denounce the South side if it holds the Team Spirit exercises with the United States again, we cautioned the South side to give it deep consideration.

The South side gave no answer to our logical refutation. Concluding the contact, our side expressed our expectation that the South side will prudently study our momentous, forward-looking new proposals and will react positively to them, so that we can finalize arrangements for a draft agreement.

The South side said that it will study in depth our momentous new proposals and will give us an affirmative answer at the next meeting. It was agreed that the next contact will take place on 28 December.

The first delegates' meeting to discuss the nuclear issue in accordance with the agreement reached at the fifth round of the North-South high-level talks was held at Tongilgak, on our side, on 26 December.

Daily Pushes for Denuclearization at Earliest Date

SK2612011891 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean* 0017 GMT 20 Dec 91

[NODONG SINMUN 20 December special article: "Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Is an Imminent Task That Cannot Be Delayed"]

[Text] The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: To eliminate the danger of nuclear war in Korea and to ensure peace there, it is imperative to withdraw U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea, to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and to solve the reunification question of Korea peacefully.

The peace-loving people of the world who want to live in a peaceful world devoid of nuclear weapons are now vigorously waging the movement to establish nuclear-free zones on an international scale. Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone should be realized at the earliest possible date and has become a mature demand [songsuktoen yogu] in the general trend of the times. This is because it is not only an important matter affecting the Korean people's destiny but is also a serious matter for Asia's peace and security.

Our Republic, regarding the removal of the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula as the vital matter affecting the nation's destiny and existence and as an important key to achieving the cause of global peace, has actively made consistent efforts to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone.

That we positively advanced a proposal to settle the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone at the fifth round of North-South high-level talks is clear proof of this. The declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone that we proposed contains all practical articles for guaranteeing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including having the North and the South make joint efforts to withdraw U.S. forces and nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and to abolish nuclear bases, jointly verifying the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and the abolition of U.S. nuclear bases, and implementing the duty of a simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by international treaty.

This proposal is a constructive and reasonable one which would make it possible to solve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula in the most fair and aboveboard way, to lead our nation out of the danger of nuclear calamity, and to most thoroughly ensure the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Last July, too, we advanced a proposal containing detailed measures for the solution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. Some time ago, in a statement by our Foreign Ministry, we clarified that we will sign the nuclear safeguards agreement when the United States begins to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea

and that an inspection of our nuclear facilities can be made simultaneously with an inspection for verifying whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons are present.

This clearly shows our Republic's consistent and just stance and sincere efforts on the issue on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. It is only too natural that such a stance and such efforts have won support and sympathy from domestic and international public opinion and in the international community.

The South Korean authorities, who not only had kept silent about the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone but had also gone so far as to take the attitude of opposing it, expressed their will on the nuclear issue, aside from their intent and purpose. Also, the South side, sharing with us the understanding that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, has agreed to hold a contact of delegates to discuss and settle the nuclear issue.

These are the demonstrations of the will to settle the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone with the independent strength of the nation; these constitute a one step advance. If and when the North and the South make joint efforts, a favorable phase for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone can be provided.

All of the Korean people want the Korean peninsula to be turned into a nuclear-free zone at the earliest possible date. Numerous Asian and world people who love peace demand that the Korean peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free zone. Whether the Korean peninsula will be turned into a nuclear-free zone or not depends entirely on the United States' attitude.

Today the United States no longer opposes or turn away from the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. As U.S. authorities themselves say, the East-West cold war system is collapsing at the present time, and the nuclear confrontation between the nuclear superpowers, which were of hostile relations, is being alleviated.

The United States, declaring the Korean peninsula a test site for the confrontation of force between the West and the East, has clamored that its policy of turning South Korea into a nuclear base and the forward deployment of its nuclear armed forces is to check the Soviet Union. However, today when the two countries of the Soviet Union and the United States do not regard each other as the enemy and are talking about the need for nuclear disarmament, there is no justification whatsoever for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea and to continue to hold on to it as a nuclear base.

Furthermore, recently the United States has admitted the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and gone so far as to express its will to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea. The international community is paying attention to a series of such changes in the U.S. attitude and hopes that the U.S. will will not

become an empty pledge and will be converted into a practical act at the earliest possible date.

The source of the nuclear issue in our country was originally the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. Therefore, withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea has become a key factor for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, that is, the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

South Korea is a nuclear powderkeg, the largest in the world. More than 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed there, and they are ready to be used at any time. The United States is attempting to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack against our Republic, using as a stepping-stone South Korea, a colony and a military base, which it regards as a military stronghold and as a most favorable region for the use of nuclear weapons.

Recently, advertising someone's nuclear development and nuclear threat and making such violent utterances as choice of a strong military action and bombing of strategic points in a bid to check and frustrate the fabricated nuclear development and nuclear threat the U.S. ruling circles are more frantically running wild for a war commotion. Talking about military pressure on someone and the renouncing of its development of nuclear weapons, the U.S. ruling circles are planning to stage next year's Team Spirit joint military exercise on a larger scale.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is being aggravated with each passing day, and this is affecting the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world. Only by turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone can we remove the nuclear flash point, the most dangerous one in the world, and prevent a nuclear war.

What attitude they will take toward turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone becomes a yardstick which distinguishes whether they want war or peace. If the United States truly wants peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and the world, it should show this through practical acts to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Only by doing so can the Korean peninsula become a nuclear-free zone and, thus, a favorable phase for building a nuclear-free world be opened.

SOUTH KOREA

Canadian Firm To Design Nuclear Power Stations
SK2312024791 Seoul YONHAP in English 0232 GMT
23 Dec 91

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 23 (YONHAP)—Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) has picked Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. (AECL) to design the Wolsung three and four nuclear power stations and to supply the reactor facilities, a KEPCO official said Monday.

Korea Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Ltd. (KHIC) was chosen to provide turbo-generators for the reactors, he said.

The Wolsung units, to be built near Kyongju in North Kyongsang Province, are scheduled for completion in June 1998 and June 1999 and will each have a capacity of 700,000 kilowatts.

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and KHIC will take part in building the reactors and Korea Power Engineering Co. will join the design project, both as subcontractors of AECL.

Official: North Ready for 'Outside Inspection'

*SK1412123591 Seoul YONHAP in English 1221 GMT
14 Dec 91*

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 14 (YONHAP)—North Korean officials told South Korean officials in behind-the-scene contacts during the just-ended fifth inter-Korean prime ministers talks that Pyongyang would sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord before the February meeting of the

International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors and accept outside inspection of their nuclear facilities, it was learned Saturday.

The northern delegates also said that Pyongyang was not opposed in principle to South Korean Prime Minister Chong Won-sik's proposal for the scrapping of reprocessing facilities and simultaneous inspection of nuclear facilities in the South and the North, government sources said.

The South Korean Government plans to conclude an agreement to the scrapping of nuclear facilities and simultaneous inspection of nuclear installations by the end of January in inter-Korean talks on nuclear issues.

The South proposes to start the discussion on Dec. 20, but the North hopes to delay it.

"If North Korea promises not to have nuclear reprocessing facilities and accept outside nuclear inspection, we could pledge there will be no team spirit military exercise next year," a government official said. "I understand a negotiation is under way with the United States over the issue," he said.

BULGARIA**Protocol Signed on Kozloduy Plant Reconstruction**

*AU2012200891 Sofia BTA in English 1919 GMT
20 Dec 91*

[Text] Kozloduy, December 20 (BTA)—Experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, the National Power Engineering Company, the Committee on Peaceful Atomic Energy Uses and the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant who held technical consultations here signed a joint protocol today. The experts discussed a draft programme for the reconstruction of Generating Units One and Two. It is aimed at increasing the efficiency of the equipment and at ensuring the units' safe exploitation.

A mutually acceptable version of the programme and a schedule for its implementation will be worked out after the Committee on Peaceful Atomic Energy Uses and the IAEA come out with their final views, which is expected next year. The European Community will provide funds for the reconstruction, while the United States will train experts. The two units will work safely until 1995 after they are brought up to international safety standards.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Dobrovsky Denies Nuclear Parts Bought for Iraq**

*AU3112113591 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 30 Dec 91 p 1*

[Karel Hvizdala report: "Mysterious Questions"]

[Text] Two slightly sensational reports have appeared recently. First, the Czechoslovak export firm Omnipol—ignominiously known worldwide as the Czechoslovak

arms exporter—allegedly tried to purchase 10,000 tank grenades in Germany. Second, Technoexport Prague allegedly tried to purchase parts for the construction of nuclear reactors on behalf of Iraq.

To verify the first report, we contacted Defense Minister Lubos Dobrovsky. "I know about this. The matter is about six weeks old and it was closed. The ammunition was not tank ammunition, but ammunition in general. This is not our business, our Ministry of Defense has nothing to do with it. Omnipol only asked a question. Minister Baksay could provide more details," Dobrovsky said.

Federal Foreign Trade Minister Jozef Baksay added on this subject: "This is the first time I have heard about the matter. No one should even think about it. Arms imports and exports must be licensed and the licenses are issued by our ministry. In no case would our ministry issue such a license. In the case of Iraq, it would be a violation of the UN embargo, of course. To ask about prices and gather information, however, is another matter. Any company can do that."

Nuclear Research Group Grants CSFR Membership

*LD2512045491 Prague CSTK in English
1312 GMT 23 Dec 91*

[Text] Geneva Dec 23 (CSTK)—Although many states including Hungary, Turkey and Israel have applied for membership of the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), Czechoslovakia was given priority, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek told CSTK today. The CERN council decided on Czechoslovakia's admission to the world's second biggest research centre December 20. The CERN is interested mainly in the "Skoda Plzen" engineering enterprise, west Bohemia, Pirek said.

ARGENTINA

Nuclear Commission Head on Control Agreement

PY2312203091 Buenos Aires Radio Nacional Network
in Spanish 1500 GMT 23 Dec 91

[Text] Manuel Mondino, president of the National Atomic Energy Commission, talked with our morning newscast reporters this morning. Among other subjects, Mondino referred to an Argentine-Brazilian nuclear control agreement, which was recently signed in Vienna.

[Begin Mondino recording] This agreement involves four parties: Argentina, Brazil, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and a Brazilian-Argentine control and accounting agency, which we created on the basis of the Guadalajara Declaration. Consequently, these four parties will have control. On one hand, it is a bilateral agreement that involves Argentina and Brazil. Yet on the other, Argentina and Brazil will also operate with the IAEA. This international community agency will control—as it is doing in all [as heard] countries around the globe—everything having to do with exclusively nuclear activities, including both materials and facilities. This is a way of saying I am good, I want to look good, and I am truly aware that through transparent attitudes by society and by countries in a matter as sensitive as the nuclear field, men can reach understanding. [end recording]

In another part of his remarks, Mondino referred to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

[Begin Mondino recording] Peaceful use means that a fission reaction in a nuclear reactor can be the departing point for manufacturing military materiel or other uses. The most common uses are the production of electricity and radioisotopes in industry, agriculture, and so forth.

We are doing many of these things in various areas here in Argentina, and they have a major effect on the economy. [end recording]

URUGUAY

Nuclear Accord With Brazil Praised

PY1812211091 Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish
13 Dec 91 p 10

[Text] President Luis Alberto Lacalle and Foreign Minister Hector Gros Espiell today expressed their satisfaction with an agreement reached in Vienna by Brazil, Argentina, and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In separate messages sent to President Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil), President Carlos Saul Menem (Argentina), Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek, and Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di Tella, the Uruguayan foreign minister expressed his approval of the accord.

After pointing out that the Uruguayan Government has been monitoring this development "closely and with a broad spirit of understanding," President Lacalle stressed that the agreement reached represents "an all-important breakthrough, at a continental level, in such a sensitive area that provides a new element of security and confidence in the efforts in favor of regional integration and development...."

For his part, Foreign Minister Gros congratulated the diplomacy of the two countries and stressed that the agreement "provides honesty in an area that involves the entire region, opening highly positive political and economic prospects."

Both Fernando Collor and Carlos Saul Menem arrived on 12 December in Vienna at IAEA headquarters to sign the historic accord.

AFGHANISTAN

Mojahedin Fire Four Missiles at Kabul 19 Dec

LD1912165991 Kabul Radio Afghanistan Network in Pashto 1530 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Text] The armed opposition groups today fired four surface-to-surface missiles at Kabul city. Two of them landed in residential sections and caused the martyrdom of an innocent child. BAKHTAR's military section reported that these missiles landed on the fourth, 10th, and 11th wards of the city and caused material losses.

EGYPT

Production of New Anti-Minefield Weapon Noted

NC2112175591 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1437 GMT 21 Dec 91

[Text] Cairo, 21 Dec (MENA)—A MENA military editor has learned that the Arab Industrialization Organization has succeeded in producing a new anti-minefield weapon that detonates unexploded bombs. The necessary tests on this new weapon have succeeded and mass production has started. The idea of this weapon, called "bomb detonating cells," is based on creating deep holes in terrain where bombs are to be detonated. The bombs might be buried in such holes four meters deep or left over in minefields. When the destructive cells explode strong vibrations occur which detonate the bombs and mines in the surrounding area. These cells can also be used in building roads or digging in solid or rocky terrain.

INDIA

U.S. Technology Transfer Stand Criticized

92WP0097A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 21 Nov 91 p 10

[Editorial—"Nuclear Pragmatism"]

[Text] The U.S. bid to halt transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to Algeria and Iran raises important questions of principle. Both countries are signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and are thus entitled to obtain equipment and material under safeguards prescribed by the international atomic energy agency to prevent misuse. This is the access that NPT guarantees in return for acceptance of its prohibitions. By obstructing the access, the U.S. is in effect delegitimizing NPT and making a mockery of the claims made on its behalf by its champions. Secondly, the U.S. is being arbitrary in deciding which countries constitute a proliferation risk and should, therefore, be prevented from undertaking any nuclear development, however innocuous. The targeting of Algeria and Iran suggest that Muslim and Arab countries, other than those in Washington's good books, are being treated as suspects. It is

true that Iran's leadership has publicly affirmed that Islamic countries need nuclear weapons of their own to counter those Israel has in its large arsenal. But this is a widely shared sentiment which gains support from the failure of the international community to address Israeli transgressions. It is noteworthy that President Bush's post-Gulf proposals for arms control for the West Asia region call for a halt in any further development of nuclear weapon capabilities, thus in effect acquiescing in those Israel has already in place.

None of this is intended to dismiss the world-wide concern about the danger of clandestine nuclear proliferation, as highlighted by what is now known about Iraq's ambitions. Clearly, the IAEA inspections are far from fool-proof; the real problem, however, is not the abuse of safeguarded facilities but the development of undeclared ones through surreptitious import of equipment and materials from the major exporting countries, including the U.S. Instead of focussing on transfers made in full compliance with NPT provisions, the London club of major nuclear exporters should be working for better control of sales by their countries. The difficulties in doing this are enormous but thwarting transfers conforming to established guidelines would only add to them. India has made it known time and again that even though it is not an NPT signatory, it will not be a party to proliferation. It has thus no reason to be apologetic about its discussions with Iran regarding a 10 MW research reactor but the decision in this regard should be made by carefully balancing larger national interests with the gains, necessarily limited, to be made from the transaction. Pragmatism requires New Delhi to keep the trade-off in mind, as China is clearly doing.

Delhi Said To Succumb to U.S. Pressure on Pact

92WP0102A Madras THE HINDU in English 25 Nov 91 p 8

[Editorial—"A Matter of Principle"]

[Text] India has failed to resist the diplomatic pressure that the United States has now chosen to exert in a subtle game of forcing New Delhi to set the pace for Islamabad's agenda of nuclear arms control in South Asia. According to reports from New Delhi, India will consider the (undisclosed) American suggestions designed to promote an Indo-Pakistan understanding on ways to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia, through suitable "confidence-building" measures. Be that as it may, there is, in fact, no reason why India should sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as long as its discriminatory provisions remain unchanged. It should be noted, in this context, that the U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, has begun a campaign for a new world order based on the bedrock of the twin principles of democracy and human rights, with a clear implication of fair play and justice in international politics. Therefore, the NPT should cease to be a charter of discrimination between the so-called nuclear haves and the have-nots before India could reconsider its position, consistent with its national self-respect and international fair play.

There is an equally powerful reason why New Delhi should have resisted the latest American pressure and asserted its sovereign rights on the nuclear arms question. It was in June this year that Islamabad called for a collective dialogue between the U.S., the Soviet Union and China, besides India and Pakistan themselves, to declare South Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Frequent reports have indicated that Pakistan either has nuclear weapons in its arsenal or is, in fact, on its way to making or acquiring them. Not only that. The U.S. administration itself does not accept Pakistan's protestations. The U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, does not seem to have given Pakistan a certificate of nuclear arms abstinence after his recent visit to Islamabad. On the whole, therefore, it is abundantly clear that Pakistan is merely posturing as an apostle of renunciation, averse to a nuclear arms race in South Asia. In other words, Pakistan's offer of talks to keep the region free of such weapons is not a genuine exercise.

If, therefore, Mr. Bartholomew has still commended Pakistan's initiative during the course of his latest talks with the Indian leaders in New Delhi, it simply means that the U.S. is merely using Pakistan's proposal as its own bait to try and draw India out of its ivory tower on the moral high ground in the politics of nuclear arms race. More significantly, Washington has decided to press for a South Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone as a keystone in the arch of a new world order. In this, the U.S. is apparently encouraged by the Soviet Union's recent decision to vote for such a zone in South Asia when the issue came up before a U.N. committee.

The vote marked a major shift in the Kremlin's traditional stand that little or no purpose would be served by the creation of such an island of pious intentions in the turbulent ocean of global nuclear arms race. But India cannot now afford to lose its own sense of direction on the shifting sands of the Kremlin's policy which is coloured by the harsh new realities of the Soviet Union's own position in international politics. It is, therefore, a sign of some diplomatic maturity that the Indian leaders have told Mr. Bartholomew that Pakistan's proposal does not take into account China's status as a member of the so-called nuclear club, a factor that New Delhi can ignore only at its peril. India also seems to have taken exception to the U.S. tendency to set do's and don'ts outside the framework of international agreement—as in the case of India's proposed sale of a nuclear research reactor to Iran.

Nonproliferation Talks With U.S. Reported

22 November Talks

92WP0107A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 23 Nov 91 pp 1, 13

[Article by Subhash Chakravarti]

[Text] New Delhi, 22 November: There will be no immediate review of India's known reservations about

signing the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the proposal for declaring south Asia as a nuclear weapon-free zone after today's intense and extensive talks between the visiting U.S. under-secretary of state for international security affairs, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, and Indian officials.

As expected, Mr. Bartholomew accorded considerable priority to India signing the NPT as well as favouring the move to declare south Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone. The substantive talks were held between the foreign secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey, and Mr. Bartholomew in a spirit of developing co-operation between India and the United States.

The Indian side presented a very strong case to justify what it called its heightened reservations on both these proposals in the context of the U.S. itself suspecting that Pakistan has already developed at least half-a-dozen nuclear bombs. The Indian side also underscored the diminishing relevance of the NPT after Pakistan already developed the nuclear weapon.

The Indian side made it clear that the countries which were sponsoring the resolution on declaring south Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone were insensitive to India's geographical compulsion to oppose the move. It was explained that India was not against the proposal in principle, but it failed to cover countries like China and the larger part of the Indian ocean where nuclear weapons were already deployed.

All that the Indian side wanted was to develop a comprehensive package to safeguard its interests instead of seeking to gain propaganda mileage. Mr. Bartholomew wanted both India and Pakistan to talk to the three nuclear weapon countries like the U.S., the Soviet Union and China to help evolve an acceptable formula, which will satisfy all the countries in the region.

Mr. Bartholomew acquainted the Indian side with his talks in China and Pakistan on international and regional security issues, including the nuclear question. He suggested that India and Pakistan should take further measures to strengthen mutual confidence in security matters.

Mr. Bartholomew appreciated the progress made by India and Pakistan in preventing induction of chemical weapons. He felt such record of good and helpful co-operation should be extended to other fields as well.

Indian side explained the measures already taken to help confidence-building with Pakistan on nuclear, chemical and constitutional armaments in the area.

Mr. Bartholomew also raised the question of India considering a request from Iran to sell it a nuclear reactor. The Indian side assured him that it was only a

preliminary proposal and India would take into account its political and security ramifications before giving it any further consideration.

Mr. Bartholomew had a separate meetings with the external affairs minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki, and the defence minister Mr. Sharad Pawar.

HINDU Analyst Comments

92WP0107B Madras *THE HINDU* in English
24 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, 23 November: There could be no better proof of the pragmatic character of the Indo-American nuclear dialogue than India's promise to consider the suggestions made by the U.S. for confidence-building measures in relation to Pakistan in the nuclear field.

The U.S. Under Secretary of State for International Security, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, who had detailed discussions with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey, yesterday, made these suggestions when India stuck to its objection to signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the pet theme of Washington. The specifics of Mr. Bartholomew's proposal were not known but, piecing together various bits of information, it is possible to have a rough idea.

The U.S. official appeared to proceed on the assumption that both India and Pakistan had crossed the nuclear threshold. Then there was his emphasis on the urgency of not developing and deploying nuclear weapons. He, perhaps, favoured an arrangement envisaging a cap on nuclear technology by the two countries, in particular a halt to the development of ballistic missiles, a formal control mechanism and steps for mutual re-assurance on nuclear material.

Alternative

The first preference of the U.S. was that both New Delhi and Islamabad sign the NPT and begin talks in terms of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif's proposal for a nuclear-free South Asia. The confidence-building alternative was suggested when India repeated its objections. The U.S. official, it was clear, did not want to convey the impression of a softening on the NPT while commending a regional approach.

Mr. Bartholomew briefed Mr. Dubey on the details of the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker's recent talks in Beijing. It was Washington's assessment that China should not be a cause of worry to New Delhi. India shared this view—because of the steady improvement in bilateral relations since the December 1988 visit to Beijing by the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and the hopes pinned on the Chinese Premier, Mr. Li Peng's visit here next month.

The U.S., it was clear, was happy with the enthusiastic cooperation by India in the current multilateral talks in Geneva to finalise a chemical weapons convention, for which June next year is the revised deadline. India had raised this issue with Pakistan and suggested a joint declaration by the two sides on chemical weapons pending the adoption of the international convention. The Indian mission in Geneva had been instructed to work in close cooperation with the U.S. on the issue of chemical weapons. The two sides, however, differed on the "challenged inspections."

Pakistan cautioned

Officials here would not say so, but India was not happy with the trend in the U.S. to go beyond international agreements and insist on do's don'ts outside their scope. New Delhi could have formed this impression from the U.S. objection to the reported Indian proposal to sell a research nuclear reactor to Iran. The fact that Iran was a signatory to the NPT and subject to safeguards, obviously, had not weighed with the U.S. when it wanted India to drop the proposal.

On the whole, the talks reflected the warmth and understanding that marked the new enhanced relationship between India and the U.S. The appreciation by the U.S. of India's concern at Pakistan's help to terrorist activities was well received here. As Mr. Bartholomew told his hosts that he had done some direct and deliberate talking to Pakistan, urging it not to be tempted to aid and sustain terrorism in India.

Even while introducing the sensitive nuclear issue in his discussions, the U.S. official took care to emphasise the mutual friendship. He saw non-proliferation as a drag on mutual interests that needed to be removed. The U.S., according to him, had not invented the regional concept for the sub-continent—it was in conformity with its approach elsewhere, particularly in West Asia.

Soviets Reverse Stand on Indian Treaty Position

92WP0098A Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
16 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Sankarshan Thakur]

[Text] New Delhi, 15 November: The Soviet Union is keen that India falls in line with the nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) proposal for South Asia and is also likely to join the United States and its Western allies in putting pressure on New Delhi to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). This amounts to an about-turn in the Soviet position and though not altogether unexpected, is causing great concern to South Block.

The Soviet Union has indicated that India must be prepared to "shed the cold war psychology"—where superpower rivalry ensured predictable responses and nations like India were assured of Soviet support in crisis situations. The new emerging Soviet stance—the vote against India on the resolution for an NWFZ in South

Asia is one signal—is making it clearer that Moscow is no longer in a position to extend the kind of psychological and material support that it did, particularly in the 20 years since the signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, and that India should be ready to fend for itself in greater measure on the international scene.

At the same time, however, the Soviets are eager that trade and commerce and people-to-people ties with India do not suffer. Indeed, they expect the content of ongoing and forthcoming rounds of bilateral talks to be essentially economic and trade-related in content.

The Soviet switch at the UN is likely to be taken up by the external affairs minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki, who is currently in Moscow with a high-level delegation. Highly-placed sources here indicate, however, that the Soviet Union will not yield to India on the issue.

Indeed, Moscow's new thinking, conditioned by the collapse of the Union and the increasing dependence on the West, is that India's position on the NWFZ in South Asia is "very weak." They share the perception that the creation of an NWFZ in South Asia is an "essential step" towards global nuclear disarmament and now maintain that India has "no good reasons" to oppose it.

India is strongly opposed to both the NWFZ in South Asia and signing the NPT. While it considers the NPT highly discriminatory, it feels that the question of nuclear proliferation in South Asia has to be dealt with before an NWFZ can be created. New Delhi's apparent apprehension, though not as openly stated, is that Pakistan already possesses nuclear weapon capability or is in a position to acquire it at very short notice.

The Soviets maintain that the change in their stand on the NWFZ in South Asia is prompted by their "genuine desire" for nuclear disarmament and cutting down on "Chernobyl-like threats which can result from the slightest mishandling." They also argue that their decision to change sides at the UN has "nothing to do with India in particular" and point out that Moscow is for the creation of similar safety zones in West Asia, the Indian Ocean and South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. The United States, too, has been pushing the two Koreas to agree to a NWFZ in the peninsula.

However, it is not merely the larger issue of global nuclear disarmament and threats to the environment that have contributed to the shift in the Soviet position because only last year Moscow voted with India in opposing the NWFZ proposal. One of the main reasons, observers say, is the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and their having to toe the U.S. line on major international issues.

This was earlier evident from the Soviet attitude on the U.S.-Iraq conflict and also their position at the West Asia peace talks, which is being seen by some as a betrayal of Palestinian interests.

Solanki meets Gorbachev: The external affairs minister, Mr. Madhavsinh Solanki held talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and described it as "very productive," agencies report from Moscow.

Talking to newsmen after his 40-minute meeting with Mr. Gorbachev at the Kremlin, Mr. Solanki said the Soviet President stressed the closeness of Indo-Soviet ties and instructed his authorities to sort out the problems in bilateral trade and economic ties.

The Soviet foreign minister, Mr. Boris Pankin, with whom Mr. Solanki also held discussions, noted the productive character of the talks "with my friend and colleague." The two foreign ministers held discussions on bilateral and some international issues, including the issue of transforming the Indian subcontinent into a nuclear-free zone.

Responding to a question about the change in the Soviet Union's policy regarding the Indian stand on the NPT, Mr. Pankin said that the sides "just touched" this issue, and detailed discussions would be held during the current round of talks.

After a working lunch with the Soviet foreign minister, Mr. Solanki was to meet the Russian President, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, and his Cabinet colleagues, who control the raw materials and oil imported by India. Later tonight Mr. Solanki is scheduled to meet Soviet Prime Minister Ivan Silayev.

IAEA Chief: No Concern Over Reactor for Iran

92WP0106A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 23 Nov 91 p 13

[Text] New Delhi, 22 November—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not concerned about India's proposed sale of a 10-megawatt research reactor to Iran, the agency's director-general, Mr. Hans Blix, said here today.

He said Iran was among the 140 countries which have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so the reactor would be subject to the IAEA's safeguards envisaged under the treaty to prevent diversion of fissionable materials to make nuclear weapons.

The IAEA chief stated that he did come to India to suggest to the country to sign the NPT. "I have not come here to give any advice to the Indian government in this matter," he told journalists and intellectuals during an informal discussion today.

Mr. Blix also denied reports that the U.S. was pressuring IAEA to use its influence to ensure non-signatories like India to join the treaty.

He had come on a personal visit to the capital after attending a meeting to create favourable public opinion on atomic energy held in Bangkok last week. Mr. Blix's brother-in-law is the Swedish ambassador to India. "It was a family reunion. It was just a coincidence that the

U.S. under secretary of state, Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, was also here," he said.

As a measure of confidence in India's nuclear programme, Mr. Blix had discussed with the Atomic Energy commission chairman, Dr. P.K. Iyengar, the possibility of training scientists from Thailand here.

He said the agency was keen to extend technical assistance to India. The assistance was suspended after India exploded a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974. "India has not asked for any assistance so far," he disclosed. The assistance will include sending of Indian nuclear scientists abroad for training and also make them members of various IAEA inspection teams.

Dr. P.K. Iyengar, hinted that some nations may be developing some super weapons that do not come under safeguards of the IAEA.

Dr. Iyengar made these remarks during a meeting of journalists with Mr. Hans Blix.

Nonproliferation Pact Termed 'Discriminatory'

92WP0105A New Delhi *PATRIOT* in English 8 Nov 91
p 4

[Editorial—"No Case for Signing NPT"]

[Text] In the dramatically changed global environment after the Gulf war which highlighted the risks of hi-tech weapon proliferation into volatile regions of the Third World, a vigorous campaign has been launched to bring the whole globe within the framework of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. Such a campaign has been further strengthened by the announcement in quick succession, by France, China and South Africa to sign the NPT which they had resisted thus far. Pakistan too has reiterated its familiar position that it is willing to accede to NPT if India joins it simultaneously. All this has turned the heat on India to reconsider its long-standing approach to non-proliferation issues. The statement by Dr. P.K. Iyengar, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that India had "crossed the threshold in nuclear technology" provided more grist to the mill of those who have been demanding that India sign the NPT. Significantly even a section of specialists in this country has been advocating that given the changed global circumstances and the fact that till date some 144 countries have signed the NPT, India too should consider acceding to the NPT with the status of a nuclear power in recognition of its peaceful nuclear explosion in Pokhran in 1974. However, such a step would certainly undermine India's traditional commitment to nuclear disarmament given the fact that India has always asserted that the Pokhran explosion was for peaceful purposes. At the same time accommodation into the nuclear club of powers that conducted a test after the stipulated deadline would encourage other near nuclear nations to explode a nuclear device and claim nuclear status. Indeed there is simply no case for India revising its principled stand of refusing to sign the NPT.

India's objection to the treaty derives from the fact that while it seeks to put a curb on horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, it does not prohibit vertical proliferation. As such it is a discriminatory treaty that promotes imbalances between the nuclear haves and have-nots. New Delhi has therefore consistently held that as long as the discriminatory global nuclear regime continues, India's nuclear option cannot be foreclosed. Unfortunately, although nuclear weapons reduction has acquired a tremendous pace, little has been done to make the effort more even-handed and strategically unbiased. Thus even though China has agreed to sign the NPT, when it does so, it would merely confirm its membership of the exclusive nuclear club without placing any restrictions on its weapons development programme. At the same time, India cannot ignore the threat from Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and decline in Soviet power might have removed American expediency for turning a blind eye on Pakistan's nuclear pursuits, but India's threat perception remains. India has therefore done well to make its accession to the NPT conditional upon substantial progress in nuclear disarmament globally. For the rest, the fact that 17 years after it demonstrated its nuclear capability through its peaceful explosion, India has not become an atomic weapons power should be proof enough of its bonafide nuclear intention.

Atomic Energy Department Opposed to Treaty

92WP0104A Madras *INDIAN EXPRESS* in English
7 Nov 91 p 11

[Article by Nandu R. Kulkarni]

[Text] Opinion in the Department of Atomic Energy is overwhelmingly against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in its present form lest it would reduce to nullity the research and development programme framed with future requirements of the country in view.

Though no scientist or expert in responsible position would like to be quoted, anxiety over the likely decision of the government on signing the NPT is evident in the off-the-record talk within the BARC community.

The issue is debated intensely since Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao made it clear that India would announce its own stand on NPT.

There is no written communication between the Prime Minister and DAE chief Dr. P.K. Iyengar. However, it is learnt that Dr. Iyengar—whenever an occasion arises—is briefing the government on the likely effect of NPT on India's nuclear programme and future capabilities.

It is being pointed out that the rethinking by India on NPT came in the wake of the shift in the U.S. stand vis-a-vis Pakistan's nuclear competence. Following the Gulf war, the Americans have acknowledged that Pakistan has the potential to produce nuclear weapon. This

has been a source of serious concern to India. Precisely for this reason, India has been consistent in its opposition to signing the NPT.

India, in view of this, has been keeping its options open. The device was successfully tested by the scientists in 1974, but that was not intended to raise a stockpile but to assert the country's capabilities and potential, experts of BARC point out.

On being specifically asked how much time would be needed to make a device, the answer was "from a few weeks to a few months." And if the country has to go in for it, then certain nuclear establishments need to be free of international safeguards sought to be imposed by the NPT. Experts explain, plutonium 239 of weapon-grade can be extracted only at experimental reactors like Cyrus or Dhruva at BARC. Plutonium obtained by reprocessing nuclear waste fuel in a commercial reactor contains sizeable proportion of plutonium 240 or plutonium 241 which, because of low irradiation level, is not useful for manufacturing a device. This plutonium obtained after reprocessing nuclear waste can be used again as fresh fuel in generating nuclear power. The mixture of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide, called MOX fuel has been tried at Tarapur. Therefore, when the country has to keep its right of producing weapon-grade plutonium reserved, it has to ensure that its capabilities too are free of international curbs. The signing of NPT, in its present form, would automatically invite these restrictions.

Already India's move to sell experimental reactors to Egypt and an unspecified Gulf country is being looked upon as an attempt to encourage nuclear proliferation. This has promptly been denied by India. In a way, experts take it as an unspoken admission of India's potential. If this is acknowledged officially and if the country secures rating in nuclear field on par with China—which has recently showed its readiness to sign the NPT—then the opinion in the BARC campus might tilt in favour of NPT.

But there is a hitch. Under the NPT, a nation that has tested its device prior to 1968 is recognised as a nuclear weapon nation and China is one such country. By virtue of this recognition, certain vital installations, where weapon-grade plutonium is extracted, remain outside the purview of international safeguards even if that country signs the NPT. This precisely is the precondition spelt out by the nuclear experts and the government is quite aware of it. Even though India exploded the device in 1974—six years after the cut-off year—its potential is no less than that of China, it is pointed out.

Experts feel that nuclear club nations—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the UK and France—should concede this point in India's favour if they want India to fall in line with China. Top sources in DAE and BARC deny pressure for signing the NPT. The issue did not come up during the visit to U.S. trade representative Carla Hills to India last month though scientific advisers were ready

with their briefs to put forth their case. "It is mere persuasion to reconsider the stand on NPT," they point out.

Chemical Weapons Talks With Pakistan Productive

92WP0099A Madras *THE HINDU* in English 8 Nov 91
p 6

[Article by Kesava Menon:]

[Text] Islamabad, 7 November: A sign of the headway made at the fifth round of talks between India and Pakistan at the foreign secretaries level is provided by the discussions which took place on disarmament. This is, of course, to be understood in relative terms since no breakthrough was achieved. But as with other issues which were discussed, the two sides sought to share their problems in an open manner instead of indulging in polemics.

An unexpected announcement, contained in the joint press statement issued at the end of the talks was that both sides had agreed to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons. They also agreed to convene a meeting of experts of the two sides at mutually convenient dates to exchange views on an agreement to ban the development, production, deployment and use of chemical weapons. The proposed declaration is expected to be based on an agreement that both sides will not acquire any chemical weapons and that if either or both, have any they will be destroyed.

The bilateral agreement, which is to be explored, is likely to take the form of both sides declaring their intent to be a participant in the proposed international convention on chemical weapons and promising to adhere to the provisions of this convention.

Race for chemical weapons: By signalling an intent to become among the first signatories to the international convention and to work jointly for its success, the two countries would commit themselves to eschew the race for chemical weapons. At present there is a real fear that both are on the verge of a competition despite denials. One of the U.S. intelligence agencies is believed to have evidence, collated from procurement orders for protective gear, that Pakistan has moved ahead in the chemical warfare field. Hardliners in the Indian defence establishment are also known to be pressing for swift commencement of a chemical weapons programme so as not to be left behind in the race. It has hence become imperative to hold, and roll back, the chemical weapons drive before it goes out of hand.

From the third round of talks at the foreign secretaries level this matter had come up for discussions but the failure to deal with specifics is revealed by the fact that no joint statement mentioned these aspects in the preceding two rounds.

The costs of a chemical weapons programme would be enormous for both countries not merely in terms of the expenditure to be incurred on protective gear for front-line troops. Launching of a chemical weapons programme would introduce a fresh irritant in Indo-U.S. relations just when relations with the superpower had taken an upswing. Pakistan which is already reeling under the impact of U.S. disapproval of its nuclear weapons programme would be even more vulnerable. Given the ruthlessness with which the U.S. is cracking down on recalcitrant countries like Iraq it is inconceivable that they would tolerate any new intransigence in the field.

If the threat of an Indian chemical weapons potential is taken away, then the countervailing interest for Pakistan to retain its chemical weapons programme would also be removed. Pakistan could see a further advantage in obtaining such a bilateral commitment. They could argue that this step would strengthen their case vis-a-vis a bilateral commitment on nuclear weapons as well.

The logic would be: "If India can bilaterally discuss and negotiate an instrument on chemical weapons then why not on nuclear weapons."

The Pakistan side at the fifth round of talks once again reiterated its proposal for a five-nation conference aimed at achieving a nuclear free zone in South Asia and pointed to China's willingness to sign the non-proliferation treaty. It was explained to the Pakistan delegation and to their public (in an interview which Mr. Muchkund Dubey gave to a Pakistan newspaper) that India's stand on the non-proliferation treaty was a long-standing one and that it would not be affected by China's readiness to sign the NPT. China would in any case be entitled to retain its nuclear arsenal and so long as they remained, a regional power with a missile range covering Indian territory, India could not accede to the Pakistani proposal in its present form.

However, in a sign of flexibility, the Indian side conveyed to the Pakistani's that they understood the compulsions in terms of the pressures being mounted by the U.S. in order to meet Pakistani concerns, India could discuss a bilateral arrangement whereby Pakistan's perception of a nuclear threat from India could be reduced. Before the five nations sat together the two countries should decide what they were both going to agree on which the five nations could back. For this it was necessary for Pakistan to crystallise and fine tune its ideas, conceptually and in operational detail. This Pakistan apparently has not done after Mr. Nawaz Sharif's speech at the National Defence College on 5 June. Regarding India's nuclear programme a broad hint was thrown by Mr. Dubey when he commented in the interview that India was interested in the proposals under the NPT reportedly offered to South Africa.

In a broadly conceptual manner both sides looked into the possibilities of studying the conventional military strategies and exploring the ways of redeploying forces

on a defensive posture. The aim would be to see how the two countries can trim their deployment so as to permit maximum mutual security without letting it be seen, as having an offensive character.

Ahmedabad Nuclear Fusion Efforts Described

92WP0101A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA

in English 12 Nov 91 p 13

[Text] Bombay, 11 November: Research on nuclear fusion is on at the Institute of Plasma Research, Ahmedabad, to study the parameters, with the minimum of experiments, "so that we are in the game."

Whereas scientists in Europe and elsewhere are trying for scientific breakeven (where the amount of energy spent is equal to the energy obtained) and technological breakeven where the output must be at least ten times as much as the energy put in, India is not interested in the breakeven technology at this stage.

The scientists at the Torus Experimental Fusion Reaction in Oxfordshire, who have announced that one megawatt of power has been produced in a doughnut-shaped reactor at temperatures 20 times hotter than the sun, through nuclear fusion, may have achieved two criteria needed for it, sources here felt, though they have not seen the official report yet.

One is Lawson's criterion; where the product of plasma density and the plasma confinement time in the magnetic field should be greater than 1014. The temperature of plasma should be greater than 50 million to 100 million degrees Celsius. A scientific report about this is not yet out, but it appears that the European scientists seem to have achieved these criteria, sources here feel.

India is not interested in this technology at this stage because it may not become practical in the next 30, 40 or even 50 years, the sources said.

What is being done here is that the phenomenon of nuclear fusion is being studied in the small "Tokamak" model, similar to the one being used for the European experiment and designed by Russian scientists in 1958.

At the Ahmedabad institute, the inertial confinement method is being followed. In this method a deuterium pellet is hit by laser beams, all around it, to squeeze it to very high density (1,000 times its solid density) and to heat its centre to 50 million degrees C to 100 million degrees C by shock waves in less than one-thousand-millionth of a second.

While the cost of the European experiment is over one billion dollars, India spends a few crores of rupees "to be in the game, to be able to absorb the technology when it succeeds," the sources said.

Asked for his comments on the European scientists' success, Dr. P.K. Iyengar, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said today that it was too early to comment on it as he had not seen the original report. "It

would be a long time before fusion is achieved. Their programme may go on till the middle of the next century."

Dr. R. Chidambaram, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, where the inertial confinement fusion experiment was being conducted till it was transferred to the Centre for Advanced Technology at Indore, said that "today it is an exciting science and not technology." He agreed with Dr. Iyengar's view that it would be a long time before the fusion technology is achieved.

The Centre of Advanced Technology at Indore is concentrating on technologies related to lasers and accelerators.

Need To Reconsider Nuclear Policy Seen

92WP0100A Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
15 Nov 91 p 8

[Editorial—"The Nuclear Tangle"]

[Text] The vote in the UN General Assembly's Political and Security Committee in favour of the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia has important implications for India. It is clear that the General Assembly itself will now endorse this recommendation as it did last year, in the course of which the major nuclear-weapons powers have committed themselves to substantial cuts in their own arsenals, thus strengthening the case of the advocates of nuclear-weapons-free zones. The old argument that the promotion of such nuclear non-proliferation on a regional basis will be useless so long as the nuclear big league merrily continued with vertical proliferation has lost much of its force. Since India's nuclear policy has been based on this reasoning, it is time it took serious note of the new climate of opinion in favour of nuclear-free zones, underlined by the fact of the Soviets voting for the Pakistani proposal, and devised a suitable response. Besides the one for turning South Asia into a nuclear-weapons-free zone, the UN committee has passed another resolution which might well have been meant to be a reasoned reply to India and the few other like-minded countries which have so far only stressed the obligations of the possessors of huge nuclear arsenals. The resolution affirms that regional and global approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously.

While reviewing the significant changes in the nuclear arena at the global level, New Delhi will naturally have to consider every specific issue impinging on India's security. The most important of this is China's membership of the nuclear club. The advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia ignoring the relevance of this fact to India will plainly be unrealistic. Pakistan's own nuclear ambition is an equally crucial consideration from India's point of view. This is the nuclear tangle in South Asia and the question is what should be the first step towards cutting it. Here, India needs to take a flexible approach, to start with. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, has already proposed a

conference of five powers—India, Pakistan, China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union—to go into the question of promoting nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia. Mr. Sharif's proposal seems to be aimed at establishing a non-proliferation regime provided China is brought into it and other nuclear-weapons powers undertake to refrain from issuing nuclear threats or using nuclear weapons against any country in the region. India should consider attending the conference but only if Pakistan gives credible evidence that it has discontinued its clandestine military nuclear programme.

Delineation of Illusive Nuclear Policy Attempted

92WP0092A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES in Hindi
25 Nov 91 p 4

[Commentary by Rajkishore: "The Puzzles of Atomic Illusion"]

[Text] War and defense are affairs of defense strategy. Therefore, there are specific benefits to a lack of clarity about them. Keeping the enemy in the dark about one's strength is equivalent to increasing one's strength; however, in connection with the nuclear weapon, the unclear atmosphere that India has created during the last one and one-half decades is not a defense strategy. There is no doubt whether or not India has the nuclear capability. No one has expressed any doubts about it, and India did not leave any room for doubt, either. The only thing that is often discussed is whether or not India has nuclear weapons. There is not much force in this argument, because there is a difference not of years, but of a few weeks between having nuclear capability and having nuclear weapons. Therefore, our vague answers about having atomic bombs or not having them is not providing us with any strategic benefits. Also, because of this vagueness, we cannot even tell Pakistan to stop making atomic bombs. The world knows that Pakistan is trying to move heaven and earth to become a nuclear power. To this end, it even accepted the loss of U.S. economic aid. China is already a nuclear power. The other countries in South Asia do not have the capability even to dream about becoming a nuclear power.

Still, India does not want to admit that it is a nuclear power. Similarly, Pakistan does not accept that it has a nuclear program. Both are clearly fighting a shadow war over this issue. Both are interested in nuclear bombs, and both want to hide this desire. Whenever there are talks about nuclear disarmament, India is very pleased. It also initiates talks for nuclear disarmament. Only recently, Prime Minister Narsimha Rao had emphasized the importance of world disarmament. Meanwhile, Pakistan has been proposing in the UN Political and Security Committee that south Asia be made a nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Union and 104 other countries have voted in support of this proposal, with only three countries opposing it. This is not a political smarts; it is ethical dishonesty.

We express amazement at the fact that we raised such a hue and cry over Soviet endorsement of the Pakistani proposal in the United Nations, but we remain silent about the basic question of atomic bombs. The change in the Soviet attitude toward India is definitely an important development; however, this was not unexpected. Actually, we should have become careful when the character of the Soviet Government began to change, and should have prepared ourselves for future developments. But India's foreign policy has always been lackluster and unpractical. This policy has neither a vision for a new world order, nor a strong desire to protect our national interests. This is the reason that we do not know what to do in the changing world. Our foreign policy appears to be suffering from paralysis. It is natural that we are scared to see the change in attitude of a very important friend.

Close relations with other nations are usually for some ideal or for selfish reasons. What was the basis for the India-Soviet Union friendship? If it was for the ideal goal for strengthening the Soviet camp in international politics, then that ideal has disappeared now, because there is no Soviet camp left. But this was not the ideal; it was the international strategy of the Communist Soviet Union. If there was an ideal behind it, then it would have established separate ground for itself. We do not see such a ground now. The whole affair was obviously based on vested interests. Now the character of that selfishness is changing; however, in spite of this changing character, the relationship between India and the Soviet Union can still be strengthened. Otherwise, after millions of attempts, it could just be a casual relationship. The sooner we understand this simple fact about international politics, the better it will be for us.

The issue on which Pakistan has been able to defeat India in the United Nations is not the India-Soviet Union relationship. Rather, it is the question of nuclear nonproliferation. There have been efforts to corner India on this issue, but India has managed to stay clear of this until now. In spite of great pressure, India did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India has a solid reason not to sign this treaty. This treaty is contradictory. If all the nonnuclear nations of the world sign this treaty, then the world will be divided into two wings. Some will have nuclear bombs, and most will not. India, however, did not make this reasoning clear. If it was clear, then India would have boldly told them that only when the whole world was nuclear-free, India would sign the treaty. This contradiction was brought out in the context of Asia. It is said (not openly) that China has nuclear weapons. Thus, signing this treaty would mean that we would be weaker than China forever. Can any nation accept such a fate? It is clear that this development is political, not ethical.

China is a communist nation. The communists consider themselves to be idealists. China's rise as a nuclear power is not viewed with hatred, but with praise. It continues to be viewed with praise. Because of all this, China faces no danger to its security. This means that the

atomic bomb should be something we should hate, but its ownership should be a praiseworthy achievement. Following this logic, India should have no objection to becoming a nuclear power. Keeping the nuclear option open is a misleading sentence. It simply means that if we recognize the importance of nuclear bombs, then we should come out and say it openly. Is there an ethical opposition to the nuclear bomb here somewhere? All the practical results of making a nuclear bomb are very clear. The aid and loans we get could be reduced. They will tell us, "If you have made an atom bomb, then go eat it." Perhaps this is only a delusion. If India declares itself a nuclear power, then there will be some talks at the international level, then everything will become quiet. If it is immoral for other countries to have nuclear bombs, then it would be an immoral thing for India as well as for Pakistan. The second aspect is that the aid we are getting now is not coming because of pity or sympathy. It is coming to us because of an independent business deal. Thus, it just does not matter whether or not we have a nuclear bomb.

The idea of making south Asia or any other specific region nuclear-free is either hypocritical or foolish. If a region wants to be a nuclear-free zone, then it should be that region's own decision. This decision cannot be forced on it by outside powers or other countries. If the atomic bomb is truly a bad thing, then no one in the world should have it. If it is something essential, then even a small nation worried about its defense has the right to have an atomic bomb. What weapon we should have is not our own decision. The decision is in the hands of those against whom we want to defend ourselves. We must have better weapons than they do. It is obvious, if we follow this logic, that they should have better weapons than us. It is clear that until there is a world government or a similar arrangement for protecting all nations, the weapons race will not stop. It will continue to increase, become more destructive, or become totally extinct. There is no middle ground.

The agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America to destroy part of their nuclear weapons arsenal should not give us false illusions. This stockpile has become unnecessarily huge, and the economies of both countries are suffering as a result. Therefore, such an agreement was essential; however, basically, both nations are still major nuclear powers. This way, the world is not moving toward nuclear disarmament; it is simply on an "atomic diet." This "dieting," however, is for those who have too much fat. Those who are mere skeletons want muscles. This is why Iran and India want nuclear reactors. If India sells a nuclear reactor to Iran, then it has not committed a sin; it is just doing business. Since we have not imposed any ethical restrictions in our other business dealings, then why should we do so in connection with a nuclear power plant? Perhaps every country in the world has atomic bombs. Then this hated instrument of destruction will become totally useless. All countries will then sit down and be forced to decide that enough is enough, and that the ugly things must be drowned in the Pacific Ocean.

No matter how attractive it is to attain nuclear capability, it is still an illusion. It cannot be used in war any more. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki incidents have warned the world, and the atomic bomb has never been used again. We do not think it will ever be used in the future. The best example of this is the Iraq war. All that was needed was a few nuclear bombs to totally destroy Iraq. The amount of money spent by the United States and its allies was much greater than it would be if nuclear bombs were used. Perhaps it would be free, as many nuclear weapons were sitting idle with most of the nations involved in that war. At the same time, if Iraq had nuclear capability, it could not use it either, because doing so would result in giving the United States and its allies moral grounds for using their bombs. In that case, no speck of Iraqi land would have been left fit for living.

It is clear that if the nuclear race continues in south Asia, then it would result in useless expenses, like the poor man feeding a rich Brahmin. No one will benefit. We can mention China here; however, nuclear bombs will not even be used against it. This is also useless for China. If there is a war in south Asia or anywhere else, then it will be fought with traditional weapons. An atomic bomb can be nothing but a psychological assurance. But do we need the strongest front at a psychological level of defense? Thus, in spite of its extreme uselessness, the nuclear bomb will stay, and it will destroy the earth without being exploded. The human race has not matured enough to fully use its talents for creative purposes.

ISRAEL

Arens Foresees 'Era' of Nonconventional Weapons

TA1912194291 Jerusalem Israel Television Network
in Hebrew 1800 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Text] Defense Minister Moshe Arens said today that in the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] multiyear plan, which will be implemented beginning next year, the defense establishment will have to prepare for an era of dealing with long-range missiles and the possibility of nonconventional weapons. Minister Arens made those remarks to members of the Knesset Finance and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees, which debated next year's defense budget, our correspondent Hayim Platner reports. Our correspondent adds that Lieutenant General Ehud Barak, the chief of staff, asked the committees not to approve the defense budget framework proposed by the Treasury for 1993-94, because it contains a cut of hundreds of millions of shekels in real terms for each year. The chief of staff said the proposed budget would not permit the implementation of the IDF's multiyear plan as approved by the defense establishment and as presented to the inner cabinet.

Missile Technology Sold to PRC

TA1912130791 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
19 Dec 91 p A3

[Report by Re'uvon Pedatzur]

[Text] "Israel sold the PRC cruise missile technology and was of great help in developing the Chinese ballistic

missile program." This was revealed by a Chinese scientist at an international symposium on arms proliferation held at the University of Wisconsin.

The scientist, Hua Di [name as published], said that he had held a senior post in the Chinese ballistic missile development program and explained the PRC's policy on the sale of missiles to the symposium's participants. Hua Di claimed that "there was no real chance of limiting such sales because they were one of the most important sources of income for the Chinese treasury."

The scientist pointed to the "ironic aspect" of the Chinese missile development program by bringing attention to the fact that the Chinese missiles which are stationed in Saudi Arabia and aimed at targets in Israel were developed with the aid of Israeli technology sold to China.

Hua Di asserted that Chinese policy held that there was no difference whatsoever between selling fighter jets and the sale of ballistic missiles. Therefore, the PRC did not intend to limit the sales of missiles to other countries including countries in the Middle East.

The Chinese scientist said that the PRC had developed its tactical ballistic missiles solely for export purposes, and that it had no use or operational justification for them within the framework of its defense policy. The Chinese have developed a variety of groups of ballistic missiles for different ranges. One of these groups includes the CSS-2 missile sold to Saudi Arabia. This missile has a range of approximately 3,000 km. The missiles sold to Saudi Arabia are equipped with conventional warheads. Another group includes the M-9 missiles which Syria is interested in purchasing. These missiles have a range of approximately 600 km. Syria's procurement request has not been confirmed yet; however, additional contacts on this issue are apparently under way between the two countries.

PAKISTAN

Nuclear Exports Sold to Saudi Arabia

92WP0060A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
22 Oct 91 p 6, 8

[New Report: "Pakistan's Modern Shoulder-Fire Missiles Exported to Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] Karachi (Special Correspondent)—Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the prominent nuclear scientist of our nation said that Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world that has enriched uranium and that is able to demonstrate its nuclear capability for national defense in a very short time. He was addressing a banquet given by the Federation of Chambers. He said that the work done in the Kahuta plant to improve the defense capabilities and preparation of modern weapons for the Pakistani

Armed Forces have resulted in the production of the latest model shoulder-fire missiles. [passage indistinct] He said that the government had put full faith in him, and that its faith was justified. "We faced many difficulties in nuclear areas," he said. "The greatest difficulty was in obtaining qualified scientists and engineers. To rectify this problem, the Ghulam Ishaq Institute of Sciences is being built on a 30-acre parcel of land in Trabila under my leadership. This institute will cost about 125 billion rupees. Banker Agha Husan Aabdi has donated 500 million rupees toward construction of this building." When Dr. Qadeer Khan had appealed to industrialists and businessmen for donations, he received over 12 million rupees in pledges. One of the largest donations was from Chanute Islamiya Trust for five million rupees. Industrialist S. M. Munir pledged one million rupees. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan talked about his family's move from India after the partition. He said that Sindh did not only give him a place to hide, but he received all of his education in Karachi. He remembers Karachi, Sadar, Chagvada, Burns Road, and Nazimabad. He is very proud of his association with Karachi. He said that some nations have stopped aid to Pakistan as punishment for its nuclear program. Those countries were putting pressure on Pakistan to stop its nuclear program. He said that he was the person with the most enemies in the world.

Many laser wonders have also been prepared. These have been sold to Saudi Arabia recently. When these "wonders" were compared with those made in Western nations, ours proved to be superior. The Western countries sell these "wonders" for 10,000 pounds per unit, while we sell them for only \$7,500 per unit. Our cost was only \$5,000 per unit. We are receiving more orders for laser "wonders." In addition, Pakistani scientists have also designed anti-tank missiles and have started production. We have received orders worth \$360 million from foreign countries. He said that when General Zia had ordered the start of the uranium enrichment process in 1981 and visited the Kahuta plant, he was amazed. To reward him for his services, General Zia ordered the Kahuta laboratory named for Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Dr. Khan considered it a great honor that a research facility was named after a scientist.

Khan Praised for Helping Iranian Nuclear Program

92WP0060C Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
14 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Rafiq Dogra: "Nuclear Technology and Pakistan-U.S. Relations"]

[Text] The "uncle" and the leader for world peace had recommended for Pakistan a cheap and easy prescription for its defense. Haji Malik Mohammed Qasim, chairman of the PDA [People's Democratic Alliance], and the Indian newspapers have given the details of this prescription, according to which, the "uncle" says that Pakistan should retract its nuclear program to the level

recommended to President Ghulam Ishaq Khan by Ms. Benazir Bhutto. She had explained this to the Western news media and expressed extreme anger and disappointment. The "uncle," in response to it, was going to reinstate military and economic aid to us, and would consider an attack by India on Pakistan as an attack on the United States of America. The PDA Central President, Haji Malik Qasim, has demanded that we follow up on the "uncle's" prescription, and has declared it to be essential for our country's interests and defense. Soon after the news about this prescription, Indian newspapers published details of their commander-in-chief's visit to the United States. Their commander-in-chief is of the same religion as the "uncle." According to these details, it is clear that military cooperation on a large scale will take place between India and the United States. This cooperation includes joint military exercises, planning, and the manufacture of weapons. India will not help the "uncle;" actually, it will be the "uncle" who helps India. We do not know if Haji Qasim has exaggerated the news about this cooperation. The speed with which he called a press conference and emphasized the importance of following up on this prescription makes us think that he is more worried about our defense than the whole country. "Uncle" will sincerely consider an attack on Pakistan as if it was an attack on New York City. He will protect Pakistan, and at the same time, will have large-scale military cooperation with India, will hold joint military exercises, make ammunition, and then fight against India to help us.

Haji Mohammed Malik Qasim can tell based on his vast experience that a person cannot have relations with two opposing parties. How can that person fulfill the demands of both parties at the same time? How can he keep them both happy at once? How will the people of Pakistan trust "uncle's" prescription in light of their previous experience with him? This leader of the PDA is ordering us to follow the latest prescription just to make "uncle" happy. Another leader is informing the country about Ghulam Ishaq Khan's conspiracy to upset "uncle." He was briefing a local newspaper and telling them about the world and Pakistan. He expressed more anger and disappointment than his party's leader, and declared that the president of our country sold our nuclear technology during his recent trip to Iran. He said that "uncle" will get angry at this act, and that this anger would not be good for the nation and its people. The president of the PDA is angry at our president, because he has made the United States angry by secretly preparing an atomic bomb. The leaders of the PDA are angry at our president for selling nuclear technology to Iran, and upsetting the "uncle" even more. Haji Qasim, in order to make "uncle" happy, wants to contract our defense out to him and advise us to give up our nuclear preparations. Even if we consider that nuclear technology is just a plant for manufacturing drinks, and that it can be smuggled like scrap from one country to another, here still is the question of why the whole PDA leadership has forgotten its entire past and about Pakistan's nuclear program. Why is it playing the politics of

leaving our national defense at the whim of the United States just to make it happy? No politician or member of any political party can support the idea of contracting our national defense out to someone else. No leader who claims to be patriotic will support outside forces rather than his own country and its people. The PDA claims to have more popular support than any other party. The accusations that the president has made "uncle" angry by making progress in the nuclear area and selling nuclear technology to Iran can be the greatest honor in the Islamic world. He should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, because peace in Pakistan and the Islamic world depends on it, and not on the happiness of the United States of America.

Analysts Urge Nonproliferation in Region

92WP0109Z Karachi DAWN in English 3, 4 Dec 91

[Articles by Munir Ahmad Khan, former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission]

[3 Dec 91 p 12]

[Text] There is a growing realisation by the international community that there should be an early reduction in, and ultimate elimination of, all types of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons to ensure survival of mankind. With the end of the cold war, the prospects for concrete agreements towards meaningful disarmament have improved.

The signing of the landmark START Treaty and unilateral offers of reduction in the deployment of tactical and other nuclear weapons constitute a significant step forward. Although these measures will still leave both USA and USSR with enormous nuclear stockpiles for overkill they represent a new thinking and could generate greater momentum towards achievement of arms control. This change in the international climate could hopefully pave the way for the initiation of constructive dialogues at the regional level among various nuclear contenders.

Western defence analysts believe that nuclear weapons are unusable at the global level and extremely difficult to employ in regional conflicts because of their possible triggering effect leading to worldwide conflagration. The prestige and power associated with nuclear weapons in the 1960's have faded because they are no longer considered to be effective in ensuring ultimate security or winning a decisive victory.

South Asia is a crucial region with respect to nuclear proliferation. Even though it is backward economically and technologically, yet due to combination of concerted efforts and political will, it has made considerable advances in nuclear technology. India carried out an underground nuclear explosion in 1974 and Pakistan is alleged to have acquired nuclear capability.

Some outside observers fear that given the adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan, a nuclear arms

race could develop between the two with serious consequences for regional and global security. The two countries already spend a high percentage of their respective national budgets on defence. Added pursuit of nuclear weapons could further strain their economies causing internal difficulties and social and political unrest.

While these arguments against acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan appeal to the outside observers they are not shared by their respective policy makers and public at the present time.

India, because of its past history, large population, and geographical location, aspires not only to be a regional but a global power. It reckons that in order to make this power credible, the acquisition of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems is necessary to project it beyond its frontiers. It also wants a seat on the Security Council. There are many Indians who believe that India must match the nuclear and military capability of China to offset Chinese influence in the region and the World.

India has repeatedly asserted that in spite of the underground nuclear explosion carried out in 1974, India's nuclear programme is peaceful and it has not carried out any further nuclear tests. However, it objects to the signing of NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] which it regards as discriminatory. It is willing to forego the nuclear option only as part of a worldwide nuclear disarmament regime which would also cover the two superpowers. It also alleges that Pakistan's nuclear programme poses a threat which compels it to continue on the nuclear path.

Pakistan's Perceptions: As seen by Pakistan, India aims at establishing its hegemony over the entire South Asian region and an atomic arsenal could give it the power to carry out nuclear blackmail. Pakistan being only one-eighteenth of the size of India feels very insecure and is forced to maintain a sizeable army though much smaller than that of its much larger neighbour. Nuclear capability is seen as the ultimate deterrent against any Indian aggression and a guarantee of security. Pakistan, therefore, is unwilling to give up the nuclear option as long as India does not do the same.

India was one of the first developing countries to initiate a long-range atomic energy programme with the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1948. At the opening of its first reactor in 1956, Indian PM [Prime Minister] Nehru said "We shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes." However, the situation began to change soon after India started building the Canadian-supplied 40 MW [megawatts] plutonium production reactor. Soon after its completion, Dr Bhaba stated that "in two years India could produce nuclear weapons."

In 1963 just before the completion of a reprocessing plant adjacent to the Canada-India reactor, Nehru said: "nuclear weapons are an expensive proposition and would be a drain on our resources. Nevertheless, we would do anything possible to meet the nuclear threat."

At that time it was difficult to identify any nuclear threat to India from the region or elsewhere.

It appears that the development of nuclear weapons has been very much in the minds of the Indian leaders long before China exploded a nuclear device in 1964. India started definitive plans to stage an underground nuclear explosion in mid-1960s. In fact in September 1971 during the 4th Geneva Conference Dr Sarabhai, the Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission publicly announced India's interest in carrying out an underground nuclear explosion which was later confirmed by Mrs Indira Gandhi. This was a clear signal to the world that India was on the way to explode a nuclear device as a first step towards acquisition of nuclear weapons.

These policy statements were matched by a rapid expansion of India's unsafeguarded programme. Today, India possesses a large number of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities including 2 plutonium production reactors, 3 reprocessing plants, and facilities for production of tritium, lithium, and beryllium which are the essential ingredients for sophisticated nuclear weapons.

It is estimated that at the end of 1990, India had an unsafeguarded plutonium inventory of about 1,200 kg, out of which weapons grade plutonium was about 600 kg, increasing at the rate of 45 kg per year. In addition, India has built an ultracentrifuge enrichment facility consisting of several thousands centrifuges near Bangalore which could produce highly enriched uranium. From purely technical point of view, it appears that besides having stockpiled enough weapon-grade plutonium for over 100 devices, India already possesses the capability to produce at least 20 more devices per year. This does not take into account the potential weapons use of very considerable unsafeguarded reactor grade plutonium which India is accumulating from its several power reactors. It is thus possible that by end-1990s, India could have nuclear material for manufacturing over 300 nuclear weapons.

India has been going ahead with a parallel development of a viable delivery system. It already tested the intermediate-range ballistic missile AGNI with a range of 2500 km. Its range can be doubled and accuracy improved. In addition, India is also known to have a strong interest in building its own nuclear submarines. Through loaning a nuclear submarine from USSR it has acquired technical knowhow for designing its own submarines in the future. India thus has a very comprehensive and well-planned nuclear programme backed by an aggressive delivery system. By mid-90s India could pose a credible nuclear threat within the region and beyond.

Pakistan was a late starter in the nuclear field and its nuclear programme is much smaller and limited as compared to that of India. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established in 1958.

Pakistan's nuclear programme received importance after 1972 when it was put directly under the Prime Minister.

During the same year, the 125 MW Candu power reactor at Karachi was commissioned. However, the 1974 nuclear explosion by India had a very adverse effect on Pakistan's nuclear programme. It led to the imposition of restrictions and embargoes on the supply of nuclear knowhow, materials and facilities to Pakistan.

A number of contracts which Pakistan has signed with the supplier states were unilaterally cancelled or not honoured. These included those relating to supply of a small heavy water plant with Germany, a fuel fabrication plant with Canada and a reprocessing plant with France.

In addition, Canada imposed a strict embargo on the supply of all spare parts, fuel materials and technical services for operation of KANUPP [Karachi Nuclear Power Project] which was and remains under safeguards of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. All this created serious difficulties for Pakistan and slowed down its programme.

[4 Dec 91 pp 11, 16]

[Text] In 1976, to meet its power shortages, Pakistan embarked upon a plan for building light water reactors, nuclear power plants which require slightly enriched uranium. It proceeded with R&D work on uranium enrichment in 1976 and took several years to build a small facility which is in operation at Kahuta. Based on the experience with this facility, it might be possible in the future to produce enough enriched uranium to meet the needs of a light water reactor.

Pakistan has also acquired basic capability in several other areas of nuclear fuel cycle. It produces its own uranium, fabricates natural uranium fuel, has constructed facilities for research and development in various fields at PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] where it is now completing a 10 MW [megawatts] research reactor to replace the 25-year-old MW swimming pool reactor. The new reactor will be under IAEA safeguards.

It is quite clear that Pakistan's nuclear programme is much smaller as compared to that of India. Its only power reactor and the two research reactors are all under Agency's safeguards. The facilities outside safeguards include R&D enrichment facility at Kahuta, a small fuel fabrication plant at Chasnupp fed by a uranium fuel production facility at D.G. Khan.

Pakistan has not acquired a nuclear delivery system. In any case Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon or device which can be fitted into a supersonic aircraft or missile.

Pakistan has been concerned about India's growing nuclear capability for a considerable time. In 1964 when India completed a reprocessing plant, it openly asserted that it could explode a nuclear device in a relatively short time. Pakistan conveyed its fears to both Canada and the United States but both played down the prospects of India going nuclear. In fact, Dr Seaborg, the Chairman of

US Atomic Energy Commission during his visit to Pakistan in mid-60s told the Pakistani authorities that India did not have the capability and knowhow to go nuclear. But this could not allay Pakistan's genuine fears.

When the discussions started on the draft of NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty], Pakistan proposed that firm guarantees should be given to the non-nuclear weapon states against any nuclear attack or blackmail. However, the sponsors of NPT refused to agree to any such provisions. In September 1971 when India openly announced its interest in carrying out an underground nuclear explosion, very little notice was taken of these plans. At the insistence of a few countries including Pakistan, Prime Minister Trudeau approached India but failed to get any assurances that plutonium from Canada-India reactor would not be used for staging a nuclear explosion.

In contrast with India's growing interest in nuclear weapons Pakistan decided to make its position very clear. At the inauguration of KANUPP [Karachi Nuclear Power Project] in November 1972, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan made a declaration of Pakistan's nuclear policy in the following words:

"Pakistan believes in using atomic energy for peaceful purposes and as an instrument for development and progress.... The most menacing problem in the sub-continent is that of poverty and misery of its peoples. Atomic energy should become a symbol of hope rather than of fear. For this reason, we would welcome if this entire sub-continent by the agreement of the countries concerned could be declared to be a nuclear-free zone and the introduction of nuclear weapons banned the same way as the Latin American countries have done."

India instead of responding positively to this peaceful overture went ahead with an underground nuclear explosion in May 1974. Surprisingly, the nuclear weapons states themselves did not express any strong indignation officially but their Press was more critical. Later, the advanced countries decided to impose embargoes and restrictions on the supply of nuclear technology, materials and equipment to non-nuclear states not signatory to the NPT.

The overall effect was a set-back to development of peaceful nuclear energy programmes throughout the world. Pakistan was most seriously affected. In the first instance, India's underground nuclear explosion had maximum political impact on the public opinion in Pakistan and heightened fears of India's nuclear hegemony over the region. Secondly, while the supplier states were slow in cutting off cooperation with India, Pakistan suffered most in terms of denial of supplies of nuclear equipment and technology. Almost all its international supply contracts which were under safeguards were cancelled causing financial loss and serious delays in implementing Pakistan's nuclear programme.

It has been alleged that Pakistan's programme of enrichment of uranium and construction of various other

facilities are meant to build nuclear weapons and Pakistan has already either made a nuclear device or has the capability of doing so in a short time. These allegations have been repeatedly refuted by the Government of Pakistan which has reaffirmed again and again that its nuclear programme is peaceful and it has no intention of making nuclear weapons.

Until October 1989, the President of USA continued to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. However, in September 1990, he did not issue such certification as required under the Pressler Amendment and consequently all US military and economic assistance to Pakistan was cut off. Pakistan's stand is that nothing has happened or changed between October 1989 and September 1990 to invoke Pressler Amendment. Incidentally, USA has not charged that Pakistan does actually possess a nuclear device. It is a matter of how the Pressler Amendment is interpreted legally and politically by USA. The fact that USA and Pakistan are continuing intensive discussion on the matter indicates a desire to resolve this dispute amicably and restore normal cooperation between the two countries.

Pakistan is a developing country with very limited scientific, technological and economic resources. It can neither pursue nor afford the acquisition of nuclear weaponry and its delivery system which will be too expensive. This is why successive governments in Pakistan have pursued a policy of making South Asia free of all nuclear weapons. Since 1974 it has been advocating the establishment of NFZ [Nuclear-Free Zone] in South Asia which has been repeatedly endorsed by an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly.

India has so far refused to respond positively to the various UN resolutions on this matter. Pakistan has also continued to press India bilaterally on the nuclear issue. Several letters between the heads of two governments have been exchanged and a number of discussions held at different levels. These contacts are still continuing but without any apparent breakthrough so far.

Over the years Pakistan has made several specific proposals to India to strengthen non-proliferation regime in South Asia. These include: simultaneous accession by India and Pakistan to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; acceptance of full-scope safeguards; mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; joint declaration, renouncing the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons; establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia; convening of a conference of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia under UN auspices; and a bilateral treaty to ban all nuclear tests.

These proposals offer a wide range of possibilities to India to take some meaningful steps towards denuclearisation of South Asia and preventing a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent. In spite of the flexibility shown by Pakistan, India has not yet responded affirmatively to any of the above proposals.

Pakistan is willing to consider any alternative proposal by India which would serve to establish a non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime in South Asia to be applied equally to both India and Pakistan. It would be both unrealistic and unfair to expect Pakistan to agree to any specific non-proliferation measures unilaterally as it would leave India free to pursue nuclear option and thereby defeat the very purpose of achieving non-proliferation in the area.

In December 1985, both sides agreed to take a small step towards lowering nuclear tensions in the region by agreeing not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. It took 3 years to negotiate the text of the agreement which was signed in December 1988 and formally ratified at the end of January 1991. Under this agreement both sides must exchange a list of all nuclear facilities not later than January 1st, 1992 which they are expected to do so.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has continued to press for greater international support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime in South Asia. India has been objecting to the establishment of an NFZ in South Asia by arguing that such an NFZ could not go ahead without global nuclear disarmament and involving China.

Consequently, the Pakistan Government approached the United States, Soviet Union and China to take part in a meeting to discuss the establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia. After obtaining their consent, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has proposed a five-power meeting consisting of representatives of USA, USSR, China, India and Pakistan to discuss this matter. India's initial reaction has been negative.

However, it is hoped that India might show a measure of flexibility on this issue. In fact, the holding of such a

five-power meeting could provide an excellent opportunity to enter into a meaningful discussion on non-proliferation issue in this region and constitute a significant step in the right direction.

In August 1991, China announced its decision, in principle, to sign the NPT. This is a major development and may serve to neutralise many of the objections of India to the establishment of NFZ in South Asia by practically removing the so-called China factor. The initial comment by India on this announcement does not indicate any change in India's nuclear stance.

This seems to show that basically India's nuclear policy will not be determined by Chinese decision to sign the NPT or Pakistan's willingness to do so simultaneously with India but on other considerations and perceptions. It gives the indication that India wants to become a nuclear weapon state anyhow, assert its position as a global power and claim a seat in the Security Council to play a wider political and security role. If these are indeed, the real objectives of India's policy then there will be grave problems in achieving non-proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere, too.

There is no doubt that non-proliferation in South Asia is a very serious problem and any lasting solution must address the genuine concerns of all the countries of this region.

In the present global climate, India cannot continue to say 'no' to all the non-proliferation proposals and initiatives and defy the international community which is pressing India for a response. In the interest of welfare of the people of this region, a dialogue between India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue must begin soon before the tempo of the nuclear race in South Asia quickens and more resources are committed to the pursuit of the nuclear option which could be destabilising not only for the region but for the world also.

NATO Doubts Soviet Nuclear Arms Future

*PM2312090191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Dec 91 Union Edition p 1*

[A. Sychev article: "Will Baker Manage To Reassure NATO?"]

[Text] Political development in our disintegrating vast country and the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal—these are the central topics at the NATO Council's winter session, which has opened in Brussels. The North Atlantic alliance is urgently seeking answers to the many questions posed by the breakup of the USSR. Will J. Baker, who has arrived in Brussels from Kiev, be able to give satisfactory answers to them?

Great doubts beset NATO in connection with the future of almost 30,000 nuclear warheads. At the entrance to NATO headquarters, J. Baker told journalists in passing that he had received "very, very firm assurances" from the Soviet authorities. However, the statement by the president of Kazakhstan that this state does not intend to be in a hurry to destroy its own share of the Soviet nuclear legacy poured oil on the flames of doubts to which the West is prey.

NATO Secretary General M. Woerner is sure that the Soviet nuclear arsenal is now under unified control, but he is not at all sure whether this situation will persist after the official report on the end of the USSR. NATO is also concerned that the young states might encounter difficulties on apportioning the quota which the Soviet Union accepted under the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces and arms in Europe.

In general, the entire edifice of European security and cooperation, which has only just started acquiring a real outline, is threatened with destruction. In the opinion of a high-ranking NATO figure, who wished to remain anonymous, "it is impossible to speak of the architecture of security when bricks continue to tumble out of the brickwork and the whole wall is on the point of collapsing."

The events in the Soviet Union are now being discussed at NATO Headquarters. Commentators point out that the U.S. secretary of state, on the basis of what he saw and heard during his visit, will attempt to secure his colleagues' consent to the U.S. proposal to create "tactical forces" which will engage in giving direct humanitarian and technical assistance to the states of the former USSR.

Washington put this idea to NATO several days ago, and no one has discussed it, yet it already has its opponents. France was not slow to come out against giving NATO new tasks not within its guidelines.

We will very soon know the conclusions and possible decisions at which the ministers will arrive—the session will last one day. Obviously, J. Baker's impressions are not the most optimistic, and E. Shevardnadze's latest warning on the approach of serious and undesirable

events in the former USSR (putsch, riots...) will still prompt NATO to agree to give us assistance through NATO channels but, as commentators point out, "on tough terms."

The NATO countries' ministers will meet again in the Sessions Hall 20 December, but this time they will be joined by the foreign ministers of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. A seat is also provided at the table for a Soviet delegation, which was to have been headed, as proposed, by Union Minister E. Shevardnadze. However, he has decided not to attend the first session of the NATO Cooperation Council in Brussels. His place will be taken by USSR Ambassador to Brussels N. Afanasyevskiy, who will be joined, so people in the bloc's headquarters hope, by representatives of the sovereign republics (in all, together with the USSR—25 states).

The agenda of the meeting, to be held by decision of the NATO countries' heads of state and government, is not known. It will not be wrong to say that the disintegrating Soviet Union will be discussed there as well. According to reports being received, an agreement to hold similar annual meetings of the defense ministers of the 25 European states, the United States, and Canada will also probably be reached at the council session.

But most likely, Western agencies point out, this meeting will be ceremonial in nature.

Japanese Report on Nuclear Weapons Rejected

*LD2312201991 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1752 GMT 23 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Dec (TASS)—All nuclear warheads that were on Soviet medium- and short-range missiles, as well as those missiles that have outlived their usefulness, have been dismantled. There are no nuclear warheads from obsolete missiles in weapon delivery units. This was stated to a TASS correspondent today by Lieutenant General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy chief of a main directorate of the Defense Ministry, commenting on a report in the Japanese newspaper ASAHI that the Soviet military "does not have precise information on the location of old warheads or on their storage conditions."

Every nuclear munition—be it a shell, a warhead, or a mine—is from the moment of its manufacture to the day of its utilization under the careful control of the appropriate Defense Ministry service. All of the munitions, as well as their individual components, have individual numbers. All movements of nuclear munitions are reported to the Defense Ministry which, in turn, informs the supreme state leadership. The rigorous and effectively functioning system totally excludes the likelihood that there might be "uncounted" nuclear munitions anywhere, the military leader stressed.

With regard to the working-level consultations mentioned in the ASAHI report, only representatives of the component organs of the United States and of our country took part in them. Therefore, the Japanese newspaper's reference to certain circles involved in the consultations cannot but give rise to bewilderment, Lt. Gen. S. Zelentsov concluded.

DPRK's Nuclear Program Analyzed

PM2412125591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 91 p 3

[Interview with Valeriy Yermolov, "expert on Korean problem," by A. Platkovskiy; date and place not given: "Revolutionary Ecstasy: No Pants, But Bomb. Pyongyang's Nuclear Program Reaches Critically Dangerous Point, Valeriy Yermolov, Expert on Korean Problem, Reckons"]

[Text] [Platkovskiy] A DPRK-ROK agreement was recently signed in Seoul on reconciliation, nonaggression, cooperation, and exchanges. Does this herald an end to the "cold war" on the Korean peninsula?

[Yermolov] Needless to say, it is still too early to speak of an end to the protracted military-political confrontation and mutual alienation between the DPRK and the ROK. Both sides have taken the first step toward reconciliation. And in order for this to occur they had to sidestep many contentious elements. The resolution of these elements has been postponed till the future. That is why it came as a surprise to most observers that the agreement was concluded so rapidly—back in October, at the previous meeting of the DPRK and ROK prime ministers, the sides' positions were extremely far-removed from one another. It is worth noting that the North, whose position has always been notable for its rigidity and lack of compromise, made particularly marked concessions. It is thought that outside pressure, above all from China, was put on Pyongyang.

It is also hard to predict how the talks will go between Pyongyang and Seoul on the question of ridding the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons. Now, when President No Tae-u has said that there is not a single unit of nuclear weapons on ROK territory, everything is being held up by the DPRK's refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspections of its nuclear installations. Pyongyang must not only say that it is not developing nuclear arms but also prove this to the world community.

[Platkovskiy] Why did Pyongyang need nuclear weapons? Does it really want to "conquer" South Korea with these weapons?

[Yermolov] Presumably North Korea needs nuclear weapons as a guarantee of its autonomy, based on the "chuche" policy. Particularly now, given the radical changes taking place in the world and the DPRK's

increasing isolation since Moscow established diplomatic relations with South Korea. In Pyongyang's viewpoint, nuclear weapons constitute a weighty argument in its dialogue with Seoul. In addition—and this is possibly the main element—possession of nuclear weapons, the North Korean leadership reckons, will impel the United States to establish direct contacts with the DPRK and speed up the normalization of relations with Japan.

[Platkovskiy] It is claimed that Moscow facilitated Pyongyang's uncontrolled nuclear program?

[Yermolov] North Korea embarked on nuclear studies in the sixties. It was then that North Korean nuclear scientists started going to the Soviet Union for a tour of duty at Dubna [Soviet nuclear research institute] and a small nuclear reactor, used solely for scientific purposes, was built outside Pyongyang, near the town of Yongbyon. This reactor, I must note, was immediately put under IAEA control. The fact that Pyongyang had its own plans which it kept secret from Moscow is another matter.

During the eighties the North Koreans built a second nuclear reactor on their own in the same place, in Yongbyon, as well as an installation producing fuel for this reactor. As far as I know, construction of the production capacities needed to produce fissionable materials used both for peaceful purposes and for developing a nuclear bomb will be completed within the next few months. These installations have so far not been put under IAEA control.

[Platkovskiy] You get the impression that Moscow is reacting extremely sluggishly to its former ally's dangerous game....

[Yermolov] As a depositary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Soviet Union acted and acts on the premise that the signing and unconditional enacting of the agreement on guarantees with the IAEA is the DPRK's direct commitment under this treaty and therefore must be carried out unconditionally. Moscow is putting pressure on Pyongyang in this area within the IAEA and also through surviving diplomatic channels. I must admit that full use has not hitherto been made of such of Moscow's levers for pressure as economic and continuing military cooperation with Pyongyang, aid in the construction of a nuclear electric power station and the training of specialists in the sphere of nuclear technology, and the mechanism of the Soviet-DPRK treaty.

[Platkovskiy] You mentioned the Soviet-DPRK treaty. Are our relations still based on that rudimentary document?

[Yermolov] Neither side has as yet denounced the 1961 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Nevertheless its fate is predetermined and there is only a short while to wait for its demise, in my view. However, it is important during this transitional period, when a new commonwealth of states is emerging in the place of the former USSR, not to allow the inevitable

revision of this treaty to become a wholesale rupturing of ties with the DPRK. Such a turn of events would indeed herald the disruption of strategic stability and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole. No sensible politician, be he in Moscow, Seoul, Washington, or any other capital, is interested in that.

Illegal Export of Soviet Uranium Detailed

924P0036A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Nov 91 p 3

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent N. Dolgoplov: "Checking In Uranium-Laden Luggage: Radioactive Substances of Soviet Make Have Appeared on the World Market"]

[Text] Paris—And so it has finally come. We have finally progressed to radioactive substances in our illegal exports.... This Swiss-Italian story is only now acquiring a concrete shape. Behind it are the first arrests and just recently filed charges. But it is probably not accidental that the sellers were attracted to Switzerland, a country with billions in its banks. This is where the chain started to unravel—from the huge building of the Union de Banque Suisse in Zurich. The first meeting between the sellers of radioactive substances and the buyers took place here on the eve of a multimillion deal. And then an arrest, made in the lobby of the hotel where the transfer of merchandise was to take place. According to Zurich police, 29 kilograms of "substances with a low degree of radioactivity" were kept in two suitcases, not protected by any special devices. They belonged to... the Honduran consul. The Italian prosecution, on the other hand, maintains that what was being sold was not some kind of nonsense but real uranium. Apparently, the contents of two suitcases apprehended in Zurich were destined for Italy. The police stumbled upon the sellers almost by accident. According to JOURNAL DE GENEVE, a sample of uranium was unexpectedly found during the arrest of a 62-year-old Swiss man in the city of Saint-Galle. During the interrogation, he confessed and named his accomplices. Two police services—Italian and Swiss—acted in unison. In addition to the Honduran, they arrested quite an international group: a Czech, an Austrian, and two residents of Switzerland and Italy.

While the servants of the law in Zurich stay relatively mum regarding whom this uranium did belong to, the prosecutor in Italy is more forthcoming: In his opinion, a very long and very thorough investigation is ahead. The arrest in Zurich is only a beginning. It is suspected that the material had been delivered from Eastern Europe, either with the help of its former citizens, or under the supervision of the Soviet secret service. Among those supporting the version about the KGB involvement is the French television company TF-1. Italian television journalists are even claiming that they were present during the attempt to hand over the 29.5 kilograms of radioactive substances. They believe that the uranium was taken out of the Soviet Union during the August coup attempt. The value of the disrupted

deal—\$97.5 million. It is possible that the initiators were former citizens of the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

Nuclear Reactors for Sale on World Market

LD1612231991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Station commentary read by announcer Aleksey Abakumov]

[Text] As we have already reported, a Soviet nuclear reactor was offered for sale last week at the first international auction to be held in Moscow. There has been a mixed reaction abroad to this report. Now that Soviet nuclear reactors are becoming freely available for sale, is it really safe to buy them, bearing in mind the sad experience of Chernobyl? One ought to add straightaway that this will not be the first time the Soviet Union has exported its reactors to other countries. In the past, they have been supplied to members of the former socialist camp, among others.

Now the plan is to place Soviet nuclear reactors for sale on the international market. The idea is that they should compete with similar reactors from the United States, France, Germany and Great Britain. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] specialists believe that the Russians hope to win advantageous contracts and to force down prices on the world market for nuclear equipment.

Obviously the republic has not resorted to this just for the hell of it. A tidy sum can be obtained for a reactor, and in hard currency, which we are desperately short of. IAEA possesses information that Russia intends to build new atomic stations in countries like India, North Korea, China, and Iran. There are indications that these countries have already approached Russia with proposals on this score.

As far as quality is concerned, specialists are quite cautious in their judgments. It is thought that many potential clients will be very wary of the reactors, despite their relative cheapness. The encouraging thing is that, following Chernobyl, western countries have drawn up a program to help the Soviet side come up with reliable new safety systems.

However, there is another side of the coin. What will happen if somebody purchases a Soviet reactor on the cheap, and then uses it to produce an atomic bomb? Specialists believe this is scarcely likely. In the first place, the IAEA operates an effective system of control. Second, it would take at least 10 years to adapt a reactor to produce a single atomic bomb. So, in this respect, Soviet nuclear equipment is not of great interest.

However, there is no doubt—and this is the view of IAEA specialists—that there will, in fact, be a market overseas to which the Russian authorities will wish to auction for peaceful purposes.

Belorussian Minister on Nuclear Arms Destruction*OW1612175391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 16 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "The people of Belarus are tired of being pawns to somebody else's military decisions", Belorussia's foreign minister Petr Kravchenko told IF's [INTERFAX] correspondent before the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Minsk. The destiny of nuclear arms deployed in Belorussia and issues connected with their use, redeployment and control over them should be resolved only with Belorussia's direct participation, the minister pointed out.

As for the monitoring of nuclear weapons it should be in the hands of a unified center in accordance with the Minsk accords on forming the Commonwealth of Independent States, said P. Kravchenko. "Our ambitions do not spread to possessing nuclear weaponry", he added. "We want it to be destroyed right here in Belarus, not redeployed elsewhere.

Back last year, the minister said, Belarus called for setting up a denuclearized belt from the Baltic to the Black Sea with the inclusion of Belarus, the Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Armed Forces Ponder Nuclear Arms 'Threat'*PM2012112191 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Dec 91*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Today the leaders of the Soviet Armed Forces in Transcaucasia rebutted Italian press reports claiming that subunit commanders have been selling tactical nuclear weapons to local mafia bosses.

Let me recall that the United States has offered our country a vast sum of money—\$40 million—to assist it in the elimination of surplus nuclear potential and to establish control over nuclear weapons. The astute Americans do not offer this sort of money for nothing.

The only reaction evoked in our country by phrases such as "the nuclear arms proliferation threat" is deadly boredom. The efforts by several generations of talentless and short-sighted propagandists—fighters against the "nuclear madness"—have done their bit.

Unfortunately, specific nuclear arms proliferation scenarios have never been considered in our country. The seizure of tactical nuclear weapons by some group of terrorists to resolve the Karabakh problem, for instance, or the addition of a nuclear dimension to the Chechen-Ingush problem.

Alas, dozens of examples of scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists in our country can be cited today.

Another dimension of this problem, a less dramatic one but just as dangerous, is the sale of nuclear technologies abroad, either wittingly for the purpose of enrichment, or by error. Since it is prohibited to export virtually anything from our country at the moment, and total control is simply impossible, it is relatively easy to export highly classified and very dangerous technologies. And there are plenty of regimes, in the Near East for example, which are prepared to pay our poor military and their experts a lot of dollars for enabling them to build their own nuclear weapons, and then actively to use their nuclear potential.

Yeltsin Interviewed on Nuclear Arms*LD2112180191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0840 GMT 21 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Excerpt] New York, 21 Dec (TASS)—In an interview with NEWSWEEK magazine, to be published on Monday [23 December], RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin has stated that nuclear weapons will be under "central control."

"Republics will not control nuclear weapons deployed on their territories," Yeltsin said. "They will be centrally controlled." He also said: "We are taking control of the Armed Forces. About 10 republics will sign an agreement on the Commonwealth at a meeting in Alma-Ata on 21 December. We will then sign a special treaty on a defense union and on the establishment of a unified command over strategic armed forces." Yeltsin stated that there will be a centralized command over strategic forces, including the Air Force and the Navy. The leader of Russia noted at the same time that "the Ukraine wants to have its own army." He added that the Ukraine will be allowed to have control only over land forces. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Outlines Nuclear Weapons Procedure*LD2512212191 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1644 GMT 25 Dec 91*

[Exchange between Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Russian Deputy Vladimir Borisovich Isakov at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 25 December; from the "At the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session" program—recorded]

[Text] [Khasbulatov] Esteemed Deputies, I would ask you now to familiarize yourselves with the resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet—sorry, with its draft resolution. It is very brief and says: The RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves that the agreement on joint measures

regarding nuclear weapons, which was signed by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, RSFSR—this now needs to read Russian Federation, Russia—and the Ukraine on 21 December 1991 in the city of Alma-Ata, be ratified. So, esteemed deputies, are there any views on this draft? Right, number four please, Vladimir Borisovich.

[Isakov] Deputy Isakov. Before we vote, I would like to listen to the findings of the military specialists on this issue. Unfortunately we have not yet concluded an agreement between nuclear powers on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The flight time now is very short, and I do not know how in a nuclear first strike it would be possible to implement the procedure envisaged in this agreement, namely, to telephone and obtain agreement on this. I would like to get the precise and clear view of the military specialists on whether this agreement ensures the security of our state and whether it can be implemented in practice under the conditions of a nuclear first strike, which unfortunately cannot be ruled out.

[Khasbulatov] Right, Boris Nikolayevich, please.

[Yeltsin] First, given that today evidently this, so to speak, attache case device will in the presence of the former Union defense minister, now the commander of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth states, be handed over from the Union president to the Russian president there can be no other control by each republic. This is technically ruled out. That is the first point.

Second, from the standpoint of consultations, I would not want to tell you here the technical details which are still to some extent secret, but nevertheless let me tell you that each of the four presidents is having installed a so-called conference telephone, where we can instantly locate each other, instantly confer and make a decision, and then the Russian president has to carry out the ensuing action.

[Khasbulatov] Later, Boris Nikolayevich, it is evidently still a matter of a whole series of agreements in the development of a common strategic....

[Yeltsin, interrupting] Certainly. First we have agreed that we confirm all the treaties and agreements adopted by the Union, including on this issue. Second, regarding the SALT treaty which has still not been ratified by the Union Supreme Soviet, although it was signed—this last treaty—we have agreed to assemble with the supreme soviets of the four republics at one and the same time and at one and the same hour and to ratify it, this SALT treaty, by the four nuclear powers and their supreme soviets. When I was speaking with Bush, he agreed with this procedure and regards it as the most correct decision.

Republics Interested in 'Small-Scale SDI'

PM2012133991 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Dec 91 First Edition p 3

[Major M. Pogorelyy report: "Former Soviet Republics Have Become Interested in 'Small-Scale SDI'"]

[Text] Representatives of a number of former Soviet republics are showing more interest than the USSR's central leadership did in the promising American anti-missile defense system Global Protection Against Limited Strikes [GPALS], including at the level of collaborating in its creation. H. Cooper, director of the organization for implementing the SDI [strategic defense initiative], stated this. According to him this interest is based on an assessment by Soviet experts of the effectiveness of the use of Patriot missiles for antimissile defense during the war in the Persian Gulf. He noted that on the other hand difficulties of an economic nature may prevent the "Soviets" from carrying out the modernization of their own ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system in the Moscow region, although only a month ago such plans did exist at the Soviet General Staff.

The director of the SDI organization also reported on several details of the program to develop the defense system against limited missile strikes GPALS, which is also called the "small-scale SDI." So, as soon as 1996 a command post should be created at the Grand Forks Air Force Base in the state of North Dakota. A radar tracking system and up to 100 launchers for land-based antimissile missiles will also be brought into commission within the framework of GPALS at its first stage. It is estimated that the project will cost a minimum of \$46 billion.

Office Denies Report on Nuclear Arms to Mafia

LD1612190191 Moscow TASS in English 1839 GMT
16 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow December 16 TASS—The main military procurator's office does not know about any facts of selling Soviet nuclear weapons to mafia. The procurator's office is not investigating any cases of the sort, said Colonel Anatoliy Korotkov, deputy head of the investigation department of the main military procurator's office.

Today's issue of the Italian LA STAMPA newspaper cited "a high-ranking representative of the Soviet Defence Ministry" as saying "there were cases in the Caucasus when units' commanders sold tactical nuclear weapons to bosses of the local mafia, who later transferred them to politicians".

At the same time, cases of seizure of fire arms and even armored materiel have been reported in the Transcaucasian Military District, Korotkov said.

In this connection, the main military procurator's office intends to call on Russian President Boris Yeltsin and

Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to take additional measures to provide for the safety of military weapons and material.

Further on Denial of Nuclear Sales to Mafia

*LD1812124791 Moscow TASS in English 1229 GMT
18 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow December 18 (TASS)—“The Soviet nuclear weapons are safely stored and any ‘leak’ is absolutely ruled out,” chief of the USSR Defence Ministry Information Directorate Lieutenant-General Valeriy Manilov told TASS today. He described as groundless the allegations, published by the Italian newspaper “LA STAMPA”, that Soviet officers sell tactical nuclear weapons to the mafia.

Manilov stressed that commanders of Army units could not “trade” tactical nuclear weapons even if such an idea came to their minds. These units have means of delivery, i.e., missile launchers, tactical aircraft and artillery systems, but lack the main components—nuclear warheads. The latter are stockpiled at special bases and may be supplied to troops, according to a scrupulously controlled procedure, shortly before combat use. Storage safety is guaranteed not only by specially assigned troops, but also by other measures, including modern electronic protection devices.

It is a far from easy job to get a nuclear warhead out of such a depot without proper permission. But even if this happens, which is absolutely unthinkable, Moscow is sure to get a warning signal right away. “No such signals have been received by the Defence Ministry,” Manilov stressed.

“It is regrettable that such a respectable newspaper as “LA STAMPA” deems it possible to spread dubious news, at a time when our ministry has official bodies, open for the press and responsible for checking any military information,” the general noted.

Britain's Major Reassured on Nuclear Controls

*OW2312215191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2046 GMT 23 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] “I will announce my decision within the next couple of days,” Mikhail Gorbachev told British Prime Minister, John Major, in a telephone conversation on Monday [23 December] evening.

To have his brief telephone conversation with Mr. Major, the Soviet president interrupted his talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin which were held in the Kremlin and lasted for about eight hours.

At the request of the British Prime Minister, Mikhail Gorbachev informed him about the current stage of

restructuring of the state system in the context of the decisions taken by the heads of the sovereign states in Alma-Ata. Mr. Gorbachev described the current situation in the former Soviet Union as complicated and said that the on-going restructuring demanded a strong consolidation of all forces, noting that he considered it his duty to ensure the implementation of the constitutional norms and the attainment of social accord.

He also informed the British prime minister of the talks with Boris Yeltsin and said that both of them had the same understanding of their responsibility for social stability in the former Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev also urged the foreign partners to give their backing to the independent states, particularly to Russia and its leaders who “have assumed the role of locomotive in the most large-scale social and political transformations ever tackled in this country”.

“You should have the least fears about control over nuclear weapons,” he said. He also assured Mr. Major that the Soviet nuclear armaments had been put under reliable control.

On his part, Mr. Major supported Mikhail Gorbachev's idea that it was the common goal of the world politicians to support the states which formerly constituted the Soviet Union. The West is willing to help you, he said. This understanding is largely due to the role which you have been playing in recent years as the Soviet president. On behalf of the British government, Mr. Major assured Mikhail Gorbachev that Britain was ready to give efficient assistance to the sovereign republics located in the territory of the USSR, including supplies of medicines and food. He expressed confidence that whatever function Mr. Gorbachev would choose for himself in the future, he would continue to exert strong and beneficial influence on the world in the interests of his people and international stability.

Mr. Major invited Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife to visit Britain in any capacity.

Need for ‘Nuclear Guarantees’ Stressed

*LD2012044691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0310 GMT 20 Dec 91*

[Text] Moscow, 20 Dec (TASS)—“The danger of being buried under the disintegrated empire's rubble is fading after the signing of the agreement between the leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus,” Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview published today. “Creating the Commonwealth of Independent States is a formula which separates us from the Yugoslav variant.”

The minister said that “returning to the ranks of natural partners and allies” is one of the priorities in Russia's foreign policy. “Russia occupied a respectable place among such states as France, Germany, and the United

States at the end of the previous century and the beginning of this century," he underlined, "and it is necessary that we return to this circle." Another priority, Andrey Kozyrev pointed out, is to "subordinate our actions in foreign matters to normal economic interests."

"The concept of Russia's national security is now being worked out," the minister noted. "One must assess keeping in mind that nobody in the West intends to attack us. Yet this does not mean that we should totally and unilaterally disarm ourselves. We should retain some kind of nuclear guarantees for ourselves. Most likely, Russia will have to take this task on itself, not on its own but in cooperation [sodruzhestvo]."

A. Kozyrev stressed that Russia should help other great powers ensure world peace.

Official on Reliability of 'Nuclear Button'

LD2612002391 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Dec 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Wherever the country's president may be, he is always followed by a man holding a briefcase, a briefcase about which many people speak and know. Since the Soviet Union began to break up into independent states, the question of who in this country has his finger on the nuclear button has been raised in the media throughout the world. We have asked a further question: Who ensures that the button functions flawlessly and reliably from the technical point of view? Who is responsible for ensuring that missiles are not launched without the proper command?

[Begin recording] [N. Andreyev, chief of the Main Administration for Security of Communications (Nachalnik Glavnogo Upravleniya Bezopasnosti Svyazi)] We check literally every possible point, so to speak, from which there could come some sort of unauthorized go-ahead for a launch, and we provide guarantees that this could not occur. [end recording]

This evening, in accordance with accords that have been reached and following the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the former Soviet Union, a briefcase like this will pass into the hands of Boris Yeltsin.

Official on Nuclear Control, Possible Coup

OW1812205191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2000 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's Vice-Premier Gennadiy Burbulis answered a question by an INTERFAX correspondent at a press-conference in Moscow, Wednesday [18 December], as to who will have a hand on the "nuclear button". He said the issue will be settled in several stages.

At the first stage a decision concerning the button will rest with the heads of state of the republics where nuclear arms are deployed. "The difference will be taken into consideration between those having nuclear arms on their territory and those who have the controls", he explained. The question is to be debated more at the meeting in Alma-Ata, Dec 21.

To the question by INTERFAX how plausible was another military coup G. Burbulis expressed an opinion that "after the Minsk agreement the possibility has diminished sharply". But he urged "to be on the alert seeing how great the stakes are".

Security of Nuclear Launch Controls Asserted

PM2312111791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Dec 91 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed reply to reader's letter under "Briefing for Readers" rubric: "More About the 'Nuclear Briefcase'"—first paragraph is reader's letter]

[Text] It was reported in the press that during a talk with the Belgian ambassador, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk recently explained his remarks about the buttons for launching nuclear weapons. It is clear from speeches by Kravchuk and leaders of other republics that we have reliable control over nuclear weapons. This is, if I understand it, the way people see it in Moscow and the other capitals. But let us imagine a situation in which some so-called separatists suddenly gain control of nuclear missiles and start to threaten us all? Although just a layman, I nevertheless think this perfectly possible, especially in today's confrontational situation. Or is it not like this?!

[Signed] P. Yudakov, Moscow

First of all, it is no simple matter to get hold of a missile, especially now when, according to Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the strategic deterrent forces, the guard has been strengthened at munitions storage depots and missile positions. The same thing has been done with regard to tactical nuclear weapons by the staff of the Ground Forces' Rocket and Artillery Troops.

The use of nuclear weapons, except by the method specified by our country's supreme leadership, is also impossible. In a speech 13 December to mass media representatives, USSR Defense Minister Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov announced in the context of the nuclear forces issue that this type of weapon, in both its strategic and tactical forms, is under unified control in line with the previously announced scheme. There is no way any of the sovereign republics' presidents can actually use them.

As representatives of the Central Command Post of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff explained, the system of control of the strategic nuclear forces can only be transferred from alert status to combat status when the fact of a nuclear attack on our state has been confirmed

with absolute certainty. It will not operate in any other instance. This task is entrusted to the ballistic missile early warning system. With the aid of orbiting satellites and radar stations located along the country's perimeter, it pinpoints the moment a missile is launched from any point on the globe and computes its flight trajectory and the coordinates of the warhead section's final point of impact. This information is automatically relayed to the General Staff Central Command Post.

However, missile installations will only operate if a coded signal reaches them from the General Staff Central Command Post. Nor will the munitions for the tactical weapons, each of which has a code-locking device [kodoblokirovochnoye ustroystvo], function without a special signal. There are also other technical decisions and measures which make the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons practically impossible.

Finally, there is the "nuclear briefcase." Without a decision from the supreme leadership, not a single missile can be launched.

Minister: Nuclear Arms To Remain 'Centralized'

LD1912091291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Text] Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, in an interview with American journalists, has stated that the Russian Government hopes that the transition from the Union to the Commonwealth will flow peacefully. He has also noted that all the Union structures will be abolished and transformed. Some officials of these departments will automatically come under RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] subordination, and some under subordination of other republics. Control over strategic nuclear weapons will be centralized, said Andrey Kozyrev.

Belarus To Control Nuclear Arms 'Directly'

LD1612183391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Text] Belarus Foreign Minister Petr Kravchenko says Belarus intends to control the nuclear weapons on its territory directly, INTERFAX reports. Kravchenko pointed out that no decision on the use and redeployment of and on the control [kontrol] over nuclear weapons in Belarus will be made without the participation of that republic's government.

Nuclear Controls Handed to Shaposhnikov

LD2512214391 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2100 GMT 25 Dec 91

[From the "Vesti" program]

[Text] President Yeltsin told the Russian parliament today that Gorbachev would hand the nuclear controls to the Russian president today. We have just received a report that because the meeting between Gorbachev and

Yeltsin that had been set for today was postponed, the nuclear controls have been handed to Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Alma-Ata Nuclear Agreement Ratified

LD2512102891 Moscow TASS in English 1021 GMT 25 Dec 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow December 25 (TASS)—The Russian Supreme Soviet today ratified "The Agreement on Joint Measures With Regard to Nuclear Weapons", signed by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine in Alma-Ata on December 21.

In the agreement, the republics reaffirm their renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. The decision to use them is taken by the Russian president upon consulting with heads of states, members of the agreement.

Filatov on Importance of Alma-Ata Nuclear Accord

LD2312185991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Dec 91

[Text] Sergey Filatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, considers the agreement on measures concerning nuclear weapons to be the most important of the documents signed in Alma-Ata. He expressed this view at a news conference today.

[Begin Filatov recording] Not only have the basic principles of non-proliferation and non-use of nuclear weapons been defined—some of these are already enshrined in international agreements—the direction toward reduction of these nuclear weapons has also been defined. Two republics, the Ukraine and Belarus, simply said that they will aim for complete elimination of nuclear weapons on their territory.

The most important thing achieved at the conference was that the participants, or the heads of state on whose territory nuclear weapons are today located, signed an agreement entrusting their use—God forbid that this should ever happen of course—they entrusted the control of the button which is of particular concern to everyone today to the head of state of the Russian Federation. This is not only trust in the highest degree, it is a solution to the very agonizing problem of how nuclear weapons are to be concentrated or distributed on our territories. This shows that on this question there will be a single united command and a single leadership and a single use if this is ever needed, although as I say, God forbid that this should ever happen; a single use of this button, by agreement with the leaders of these four.

I think this will greatly stabilize the situation in the world, especially as regards trust in the Commonwealth. I think that to some extent it makes the Commonwealth

a considerably more serious affair in the eyes of the world community, because it is evident that the intentions of the leaders, heads of state are really serious as regards the defense of the whole space of all the 11 states which have joined this Commonwealth. [end recording]

Republics To Sign Nuclear Agreement

Nazarbayev Views Accord

OW2012185691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1705 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan told our correspondents that he hoped the Alma-Ata meeting "will make it possible to replace the former Union with something that works and gives our peoples no worries". He also said the four nuclear powers were planning to sign a mutual agreement in the course of the meeting.

Work Toward Elimination

LD2112204191 Moscow TASS in English 2023 GMT
21 Dec 91

[Text] Alma-Ata December 21 TASS—Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, where nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are deployed, reiterated today at the Alma-Ata meeting their commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the striving for the liquidation of all nuclear armaments.

Speaking at a news conference, held today by heads of the member states of the new Commonwealth, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev read the text of the agreement on joint measures to be taken by the above mentioned republics with regard to nuclear weapons. It will come into forth [as received] on the 30th day after the handing of all ratification instruments to the Russian Government for keep.

The document stresses that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine reaffirm their commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to jointly work out their policy on nuclear problems.

The decision on the need to use nuclear weapons will be taken by the Russian president after coordinating it with heads of the states—signatories to the agreement, until nuclear weapons are fully eliminated on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine.

According to the agreement, the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine pledge to join the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear powers and to conclude a corresponding agreement on guarantees with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

It is noteworthy that the provisions of the agreement do not rule out a possibility of the transportation of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the territory of the Russian Federation for the purpose of their destruction.

The states—signatories to the agreement will promote the elimination of nuclear weapons. By July 1, 1992 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will ensure the transportation of nuclear weapons to the bases near specialised plants to be dismantled there under joint control.

The governments of the four republics pledge to submit the treaty on the Commonwealth of Independent States to their respective parliaments for ratification.

Nuclear Agreement Signed

CM23150491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 91
p 2

["Agreement on Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, called henceforth member states, confirming their adherence to the nonproliferation of nuclear armaments, striving for the elimination of all nuclear armaments, and wishing to act to strengthen international stability, have agreed on the following:

Article 1. The nuclear armaments which are part of the joint [obyedinennykh] strategic armed forces ensure the collective security of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Article 2. The members states of the present agreement confirm the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Article 3. The member states of the present agreement are jointly drawing up a policy on nuclear matters.

Article 4. Until nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Ukraine, decisions on the need to use them are taken, by agreement with the heads of the member states of the agreement, by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] president, on the basis of procedures drawn up jointly by the member states.

Article 5.

1. The Republic of Belarus and the Ukraine undertake to join the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states and to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency the appropriate agreements-guarantees.

2. The member states of the present agreement undertake not to transfer to anyone nuclear weapons or other explosive devices [yadernyye vzryvnyye ustroystva] and technologies, or control over such nuclear and explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; and equally not in any way to help, encourage, or prompt any state not possessing nuclear weapons or to acquire by any other

means nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and also control over such weapons or explosive devices.

3. The provisions of Paragraph 2 of this article do not stand in the way of transferring nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to RSFSR territory with a view to destroying them.

Article 6. The member states of this agreement, in accordance with the international treaty, will assist in the eliminating of nuclear weapons. By July 1, 1992 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will ensure the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to central factory premises for dismantling under joint supervision.

Article 7. The Governments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine undertake to submit a treaty on strategic offensive arms for ratification to the Supreme Soviets of their states.

Article 8. The present agreement requires ratification. It will come into force on the 30th day after the handing over of all ratification papers to the Government of the RSFSR for safe keeping.

Done in Alma-Ata in one certified copy in Belarussian, Kazakh, Russian and the Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

[signed] For Belarus, S. Shushkevich;
For Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev;
For the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin;
For Ukraine, L. Kravchuk.

"Complete and Exhaustive"

LD2312120491 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1135 GMT 23 Dec 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Staroselskiy and Aleksey Tabachnikov]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Dec (TASS)—The Commonwealth of Independent States that have nuclear weapons on their territory agreed in Alma-Ata to give Russia the right of control of "the nuclear button," Gennadiy Burbulis, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] state secretary and first deputy chairman of the Russian Government, stated at a news conference today. This understanding was fixed in the agreement on joint measures on nuclear weapons. This document was signed by the heads of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the RSFSR, and the Ukraine. In the opinion of Gennadiy Burbulis, the agreement signed "gives a complete and exhaustive answer to those questions which have concerned the world community," and also contains a guarantee regarding control over nuclear weapons.

Estonia Joins Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

OW1812203991 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1715 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia has joined the treaty on nuclear arms non-proliferation. A resolution on the issue was adopted by the Estonian parliament December 18th.

The Estonian Government has been charged with preparing a statement about the move. After it is signed by chairman of the parliament Arnold Ruutel, it will be sent to the governments of the countries-signatories where the texts of the treaty are deposited—the U.S., Great Britain and the USSR (or its successor).

Estonian Minister Briefs IAEA on Paldiski Reactors

OW2112062391 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1625 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Transmitted by KYODO]

[Text] Lennart Meri, Estonian foreign minister presently taking part in a conference of the NATO Council on Cooperation in Brussels, informed Hans Blix, General Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], of nuclear reactors in Paldiski.

These reactors were built secretly on a Soviet military naval base.

Estonia is proposing to establish international control over the reactors in Paldiski.

On December 18th the Estonian Supreme Council passed a decision to join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons started in 1968.

Ukraine Predicts Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal

LD1912214791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2007 GMT 19 Dec 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Sergey Balykov]

[Text] Kiev, 19 Dec (TASS)—During 1992 nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Ukrainian territory. This belief was expressed by Major General B. Grechani-nov, spokesman for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, at a news conference for Ukrainian and foreign journalists today. This process is already under way, he said. The work is implemented according to a plan under mutual monitoring by the Ukraine and Russia.

Experts from the United States, Russia, the Ukraine, and the USSR Defense Ministry participating in a seminar

on nuclear disarmament issues, which is being held in Kiev now, answered journalists' questions. The organizers of the seminar, the Ukrainian "Znaniye" [Knowledge] society and the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, invited leading specialists on liquidating nuclear weapons. Scholars and practical workers told about their work to ensure a nuclear-free future for the Ukraine, methods for which are elaborated at the seminar by the united efforts of involved parties. A program for the most effective and safe elimination of the nuclear arsenal is being created, as well as an exchange of opinions with regard to ways and methods for liquidating nuclear means, their transportation outside the Ukraine, storage, stock-taking, and proper control.

Nuclear Arms 'Still' Remain in Baltics

*LD2212112191 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1831 GMT 20 Dec 91*

[Excerpts] As Radio Free Europe reported a couple of hours ago, Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Janis Jurkans announced at a sitting of the NATO coordinating council in Brussels that the Baltic states expect that the NATO alliance would assist them in freeing themselves from the presence of Soviet troops. [passage omitted]

Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lennart Meri announced today in Brussels that it is possible that there are still Soviet nuclear weapons in the Baltic states.

FINLAND

Penyagin on Problems of Nuclear Arms Accounting

92WP0093A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 1 Dec 91 p C 6

[Article by Martti Valkonen: "All Data on Soviet Nuclear Power To Be Compiled in One Volume"]

[Text] A map of well-guarded state secrets will be completed within the next few months but it is not known if it will ever be released to the public.

Member of parliament Alexander Penyagin has worked hard for two years on a very interesting project. He has been compiling a map which will show the sites of all Soviet nuclear facilities and weapons, nuclear accidents as well as any spots that, for one reason or another, register radioactivity on monitors. The map is nearly complete; the cartographers will be done with it in two or three months.

Penyagin is chairman of the USSR's Supreme Soviet's safety committee specializing on nuclear power and radioactivity. It is one of four subcommittees forming the parliamentary committee studying the broad range of safety issues.

Penyagin's project is already being guarded like a state secret. It will be very interesting to see if the map will ever be released to the public. The map shows a lot of detailed information which the Soviet officials have deliberately covered up from their own citizens and neighboring countries.

Penyagin is especially concerned that the Soviet state lacks any kind of policy for regulating the utilization of nuclear power, procurement of nuclear fuel or treatment of nuclear waste. As military secrets nuclear issues have been allowed to develop uncontrolled throughout the gigantic country. Attempts have been made to cover up accidents by describing them as "matters of a local scale."

"It is strange that here in the USSR we have been able to develop unquestionably the best means for enriching uranium ores and still our method of dealing with nuclear power is the most hazardous in the world," ponders Penyagin. According to him the military is to blame for this. An example of this is the fact that the graphite control rod type reactor at Chernobyl is capable of speedily producing ready to use nuclear explosives for bombs.

The Sosnovyi Bor nuclear generating station near St. Petersburg is of the same type and every bit as hazardous as the one at Chernobyl where the nuclear disaster occurred. Penyagin feels it should be closed immediately even though all safety precautions have been implemented there—which was not the case at Chernobyl prior to the disaster.

Penyagin does not fortrightly admit, but neither does he deny, that all nuclear energy decisions in the USSR are linked to the demands of the defense industries. The most he will say is that at this time the defense ministry will reply to questions on nuclear matters posed by the parliamentary committee.

Map Shows Many Nuclear Power Symbols Near Finland

The map shows a lot of symbols near the Finnish border. Alexander Penyagin does not want to comment on them in any great detail.

Generally stated the sites shown near Finland are operating and projected nuclear generating stations, the radioactive waste containing shipwrecked Kit that was recovered from Lake Ladoga, and the enormous nuclear weapons armories, missile sites, operating and abandoned nuclear submarines and surface ships in harbors as well as the nuclear waste burial sites of the Kola Peninsula.

While he talks about the border area Penyagin also points to Novaya Zemlya, which is the USSR's last remaining nuclear bomb test range and nuclear waste burial site.

The ship Kit, which was shipwrecked in Lake Ladoga, had wastes from military nuclear tests aboard. In addition to short term radiation emitting materials these contain strontium, which has a half-life of about 30 years. According to Penyagin, even now, 40 years after the shipwreck of the Kit, its strontium cargo will be hazardous to humans and animals for another 240-260 years.

The Murmansk naval base docks moor tens of outdated and no longer operating nuclear submarines. Penyagin says that they are still complete with reactors and everything intact. To date no one has known how, or had the time, or cared to decide whether they are to be disassembled and what will be done with the wastes.

Out in the Arctic Ocean the submarine Komsomolets lies at a depth of 4,000-5,000 meters and, according to the latest information, it is emitting radioactivity into the surrounding sea.

There are thousands of nuclear weapons in the Kola Peninsula, in silos, in ships or in storage facilities. There are strategic bombers there complete with nuclear weapons. There are nuclear waste burial sites at various places in the Kola Peninsula.

Approximately 11,000 containers of nuclear waste have been sunk into seas near Novaya Zemlya. One of these contains a faulty reactor from the nuclear powered icebreaker, Lenin.

"I do not know how the Lenin reactor has been packed. If it has been encased in a perforated concrete chest built to specifications with all of the required safety layers, it

can remain on the seabed without any danger to anyone. The matter is under investigation," says Penyagin.

In his opinion the USSR, aided by other countries, should quickly find out what the condition of that environment is and what effect the burial sites and possible leaks have had on the fish and water. At present no one can say if radiation has already polluted the fishery there.

Were Nuclear Generating Stations Pressured Into Tests in 1986?

A big part of the area within a radius of 30 km. of Chernobyl is completely polluted. It has plutonium which has a half-life of 24,000 years. For all practical purposes the region is forever uninhabitable by man.

"No one yet knows what the plutonium in the Chernobyl region will do in the future. It is an incomprehensibly great hazard," says Penyagin.

According to one Soviet physicist, in 1986 several graphite control rod type reactors in the USSR were ordered to conduct a test just like the one in Chernobyl. According to this source the director of the Sosnobyi Bor nuclear generating station near St. Petersburg refused to conduct the test and his engineers were just as firm. They said the test was contrary to safety directives.

"The energy ministry even sent the secret police, the KGB, to force the generating station to go through with the test but the director refused unyieldingly. Fortunately the Sosnobyi Bor director and his staff were professionally competent," says the physicist.

Back then the nuclear power matters were handled by the energy ministry which was headed by party functionaries that had no training in the field. According to the physicist it was only after the Chernobyl disaster that competent nuclear physicists came into the nuclear energy ministry.

It has been impossible to check on the Soviet physicist's statement. For his part Penyagin refers to the Chernobyl report, which will be ready in the next few months, and will cover all aspects of the disaster and nuclear power in general.

Taking care of the effects of the Chernobyl disaster will cost tens of billions of rubles and even so there is no telling if the effort will be successful.

Penyagin also reminds one that three other big nuclear disasters in the Urals are still awaiting clean up operations. The damage they did to the environment amounts to as much as 40 billion rubles.

"With the present state of the economy the state is not at all likely to pay for it," says Penyagin.

The three disasters in the Urals happened with no commotion raised. No one paid the least attention to them.

During the years from 1949 to 1953 radioactive strontium leaked into a river from a secret factory in the Chelyabinsk area of the Urals. The leak was kept secret and the entire river was polluted all the way to the Arctic Ocean. At least some of the radioactive material was deposited on the floor of the sea. The water flowing in the river had an emission rate of five roentgens per hour which is the maximum annual amount allowed to build up in nuclear facility workers. A total of 34,000 people were exposed to radiation already then.

In a second nuclear disaster in the Chelyabinsk area a waste storage facility exploded and 270,000 people were exposed to radiation.

And yet a third accident was classified with the letters ALZ signifying an accident that has local significance, Penyagin says with appropriate irony.

42,000 people were subjected to radiation in this so called local disaster. The effects of the disaster can still be seen at Lake Karatshai where the waters still emit strong radiation. After a winter with little snow the water level went down, the expanding beaches dried and the winds picked up radioactive dust from them. Unfortunately the radioactivity is of a long-lived kind.

Orenburg and the Altai Mountains Are Awaiting Studies

There previously was an important nuclear test area near Orenburg and Penyagin feels that studies and clean-up should begin there immediately. Orenburg is at the south end of the Urals, on the Russian side and near the Kazakstan border. The people living there were used as laboratory bunnies but extremely little was ever said about it, says Penyagin.

The Altai Mountains have for decades been polluted by radiation from the Semipalatinsk test area. Studies are imperative there also.

"The people in Chelyabinsk are so mad that they do not want anything connected with nuclear power coming into their area anymore," says Penyagin. He is the parliamentary representative from this Chelyabinsk district.

The Chelyabinsk nuclear fuel treatment plant has already produced 25,000 tons of weapons grade plutonium which also can serve as fuel in test reactors that generate electric power. This fuel treatment plant takes in used nuclear fuel and refines it to produce plutonium and uranium as well as an enormous quantity of nuclear waste material. The disposal of this waste is a big problem for the city.

"Even so we have an agreement with Finland to take your spent fuel. We have sold you this service and that is why we have to bring it back here."

Despite this reassuring statement by the M.P. it is possible that the increasing influence of local level

democracy will lead to a complete cessation of all nuclear related operations in Chelyabinsk.

If that happens a new disposal site will have to be found for spent fuel from Loviisa. Such a site will have to be found possibly for all spent fuel that has thus far been destined for the USSR.

GERMANY

NATO Concern on Soviet Nuclear Arms Viewed

AU2012122891 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 20 Dec 91 p 4

["ky." commentary: "A Race Against Time"]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Baker was unable to inspire his NATO colleagues with great courage. It is true that in his talks with the leaders of the four new nuclear powers, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, he was given—more or less binding—promises that they will handle nuclear arms in a responsible way or that they plan to scrap them with Western help. Nevertheless, it is still too soon to heave a sigh of relief. The entire concept of a Euro-Atlantic alliance of democratic, peace-loving nations continues to be based on many facts that are all too insecure.

It is unclear whether the nine republics of the new Commonwealth of Independent States will really agree on collective and central control of the nuclear potential. It is unclear what this system will look like in practice. Even the fate of the CFE agreement on conventional disarmament, which the Soviet Union never ratified and would now have to be taken over by the successor states, is uncertain. Finally, it is also unclear whether and how long the current Eurasian leaders will be able to maintain power.

Their success depends decisively on further economic developments. This is why aid is necessary—and aid has to come fast. However, the U.S. proposal to hold a coordinating conference is currently going through the slow mills of bureaucracy. Yet time is short. The only weapon the West has—to make recognition of the republics dependent on binding commitments—might soon turn out to be ineffective. If Eurasia sinks into anarchy, it makes little difference whether the bombs explode in a recognized state or in an area that constitutes a vacuum under international law.

SPD Official's Soviet Nuclear Weapons Concerns

LD2212093791 Berlin ADN in German 0148 GMT
22 Dec 91

[Text] Frankfurt am Main (ADN)—Norbert Gansel, foreign affairs spokesman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) Bundestag group, demands in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE SONNTAGSZEITUNG that there should be international negotiations on the control of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet

Union. The SPD politician referred to the United Nations and the CSCE. He said he would prefer it "most of all" if all Soviet nuclear weapons were put together in a site controlled by the United Nations until the countries of the dissolved Soviet Union have "stabilized again."

In Gansel's view the central authority in Moscow is in no position to control the nuclear weapons. "I am profoundly pessimistic about the future," Gansel said. In his experience even top politicians in the former Soviet Union had an incomplete picture of the nuclear weapons. Gansel said he believes it is only a matter of time before the leaders of the individual republics in which nuclear weapons are stored have broken into the central code for the use of those weapons.

Gansel said that he learned from Gorbachev's security advisor, Karpov, that fissile material is still being produced at the nuclear military installations on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Police Discover Illegal Arms Deals With Croatia

AU1512162291 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 13 Dec 91 p 8

[Johann Freudenreich report: "Illegal Arms Deals With Croatia Discovered"]

[Text] Munich, 12 December—The Bavarian Land Office of Criminal Investigation in Munich has discovered the biggest illegal arms deal so far organized in Bavaria in connection with the civil war in Yugoslavia; a total of 20 million German marks [DM] was involved. According to a report by the authority, five businessmen—two Germans, one Arab with Yugoslav citizenship, one Sudanese, and one Croat—were put in detention pending trial in Regensburg.

As a result of confidential information from the underworld, the investigators of the Land Office of Criminal Investigation learned of the planned deal in military weapons, which was to involve in particular anti-aircraft missiles, guns, and ammunition. The two Germans work in the textile industry in Regensburg, where they specialized in army equipment, such as combat suits and canvases. A 34-year-old Croat who is working as a free-lance job broker contacted them and asked whether they could also purchase military weapons for Croatia on the black market. They promised to organize the material in Prague; they intended to declare the weapons as exports to Africa—Equatorial Guinea and Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta—and then to redirect them to Croatia during transport.

The deal in the CSFR failed, according to the businessmen, because the deliverers wanted the full price to be paid in advance. Subsequently, the 29-year-old Arab with Yugoslav citizenship, who has a shop in Zagreb, tried his luck with the two textile merchants in Regensburg. A 38-year-old Sudanese who lives near Hamburg

mediated the contact. This time the Regensburg businessmen went to Warsaw to organize the weapons export there. A partial contract on the delivery of 3,000 kalashnikov automatic rifles and 1.5 million rounds of ammunition was signed. The merchants even organized end-user certificates from the alleged African recipient countries. The experts of the Land Office of Criminal Investigation are currently investigating whether the documents were forged or whether they were acquired through bribes. The Polish Government had already granted an export permit when the delivery was stopped by the producers. They, too, had demanded the full purchasing price to be paid in advance and had not received it. In the meantime, the affair was discovered, all five accused were arrested; four of them have already made a confession.

The two main culprits obviously received two installments of DM118,000 and DM80,000 to finance the deal. The money is not there anymore. It is still unclear whether it was paid to the arms producers or whether the Regensburg businessmen put it in their own pockets.

Mozambique Said To Have Offered GDR Uranium

AU2312165591 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Dec 91 p 2

[Udo Ulfkotte and Wolfgang Stock report: "An Offer From Mozambique to Schalck-Golodkowski"]

[Text] Bonn, 22 December—The handwritten note by a close aide to Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski on an offer of about six kg of highly-enriched uranium reads laconically: "After personal agreement with state secretary, no interest. GDR itself is looking for customers for its own production." Officially, the GDR did not deal in highly-enriched material; it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Even the uranium produced in the Soviet-controlled "Wismut" plant in Saxony was processed and enriched exclusively in the Soviet Union. Experts believe that only at the former GDR nuclear test site at Rosendorf near Dresden might it have been possible to "produce" uranium fit to be used for nuclear arms. However, a maximum of even less than one kg—with a black market value of \$15 million—could have been produced there.

The offer for the supply of six kg submitted to Schalck's KoKo [Commercial Coordination] enterprise in the summer of 1989 was the lower limit of what experts need for one nuclear bomb. Schalck's KoKo obviously appeared to the former finance minister of Mozambique, Abdul Magid Osman, to be the right partner for this "commodity." In a letter to Dieter Uhlig, who was responsible for the arms trade in the Koko enterprise, the finance minister offered to sell the highly-enriched uranium either to the GDR or to another customer to be named by the GDR. Moreover, he asked that the matter be treated confidentially, because apart from him nobody in the government knew about the offer.

As head of the "developing countries and export of arms and equipment" department, Uhlig was the specialist for Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola in Main Division 3. Moreover, (as an "officer in special duties"), the Stasi lieutenant colonel was responsible for the GDR's international arms trade, for example as the head of the "Imes" company, via which many of the conspiratorial arms deals were carried out to Iraq and Iran, which were at war with each other, or the PLO. Even three days before he fled, Schalck told Hans Modrow, who was GDR premier at the time, that the orders of Imes totaled 30 million German marks [DM] and that preparations had been concluded for more deals totalling DM150 million. The expected profit of these negotiations was up to DM25 million, Schalck told Modrow in late November 1989.

According to a report in the special journal NUCLEAR FUEL, the documents were discovered during a search of the premises of the "Berlin Trade and Financing GmbH" carried out by the Office of the Berlin State Prosecutor in December 1990. After the events of the fall of 1989, Uhlig became one of the managing directors of this company, which was designed to continue the management of the Koko enterprises and, if necessary, dissolve them. Subsequently, the company was placed under the control of the Trust Agency. Uhlig's entry as manager in the trade register was not deleted until 4 June 1991. According to sources from the Berlin justice authorities, the relevant documents were discovered in one of Uhlig's files bearing the label "People's Republic of Mozambique—classified." One of the documents not only discloses that Uhlig had "intensive business contacts with Mozambique," but that there is even evidence that he was involved in "arms deals between Mozambique and South Africa." In another document one can read that it is likely that the uranium offered by Mozambique is "real."

According to current information, the six kg of uranium offered by the former finance minister of Mozambique, was produced in South Africa. In July of this year, South Africa signed the NPT. According to a spokesman of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Meyer, on the basis of the stock list South Africa submitted to the IAEA, it is no longer possible to find out whether highly-enriched uranium disappeared in the RSA in the past. Harald Mueller, project manager for the non-proliferation of nuclear arms at the Hesse-based Peace Research Foundation, told FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE at the weekend [21-22 December] that "approximately since 1981," the RSA "has been able to enrich uranium." According to British intelligence reports, South Africa received "60 tons of uranium enriched between 2.7 and 3 percent from China." The transaction is said to have been arranged by Alfred Hempel, a German uranium dealer, who died in August 1989. Hempel, who was engaged in intensive trade with nuclear material with the Soviet Union, even had a branch office in East Berlin ("Isokommerz") and, according to Western intelligence service reports, he had contacts with Schalck.

After reports about illegal uranium transactions in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, published in this daily in July, police in Mozambique arrested more than 20 people. They were said to have had containers filled with "lead" they offered on the black market as uranium. According to nuclear energy experts, laymen are unable to distinguish lead from enriched uranium by merely looking at it. Mozambique does not have the technological possibilities (such as mass spectrometers or multi-channel-analyzers) to examine the seized material.

Although in the following weeks, the United Nations, the U.S. State Department, the German Foreign Ministry, the IAEA, and Interpol requested the Mozambican Government to clarify the "uranium affair," independent IAEA experts have not been able to examine the seized material. According to an IAEA press spokesman, an expert of his agency is going to examine the seized containers in "early January."

On the occasion of an official visit to Bonn, Mozambican President Chissano in September said that his government does "not know about any uranium deals involving members of the Mozambican Government or other groups in Mozambique." In the past few months—the last time on Sunday—the Foreign Ministry also repeatedly stated that there is no information about "alleged illegal uranium deals in Mozambique." According to the documents, which were seized by the Office of the Berlin State Prosecutor on 10 December 1990, and have now become public, the Foreign Ministry could have been informed about the 1989 offer and other possible connections a long time ago. Nevertheless, originally planned aid comprising equipment for the Mozambican Army, has so far not been provided. On the other hand, even before the Mozambican president visited Bonn—still at the time of former Finance Minister Abdul Magid Osman, whose involvement in the uranium deal has now become public—the German financial and development aid of DM38 million was doubled and will henceforth be DM62.5 million (financial and technological aid).

Mozambique has been repeatedly exposed in connection with shady deals that were at least obviously covered up by the government. According to statements issued by the United Nations, for several years the government failed to answer the official requests by those UN committees that are responsible for sanctions on South Africa, whenever these committees asked for help to clarify the question as to how important the Mozambican harbor Maputo is for evading the sanctions against South Africa, sanctions that have meanwhile been lifted. In October of this year there were reports that a North Korean ship had left Mozambique for Syria with a shipment of Scud-C missiles able to be equipped with chemical or conventional warheads. There is information of illegal dumping of several hundreds of barrels filled with hazardous waste from industrialized nations

on an island off the Mozambican mainland. The documents received by NUCLEAR FUEL allegedly even prove that there have been concealed arms deals between Mozambique and South Africa.

UNITED KINGDOM

UK's Hogg on Soviet Missiles

LD1912150191 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1419 GMT 19 Dec 91

[By Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] The delicate task of ensuring stable nuclear control in the crumbling Soviet Union involves "very serious risks," Foreign Office Minister Douglas Hogg warned today. Mr. Hogg told NATO talks in Brussels that the West faced a grave problem with no easy or short term solutions. But he warned the allies not to become too obsessed by the issue of nuclear control. "We must keep our eye on chemical and biological weapons too," he told the alliance's foreign ministers.

They were gathered to hear an account from American Secretary of State James Baker of his visit to the Soviet Union to assess the stability of the emerging republics and the scope for Western humanitarian aid and expertise in the handling of nuclear arsenals.

NATO is likely to play a key role in sending 140 million pounds sterling worth of food aid agreed by the European Community earlier this week. Mr. Baker said NATO's unique expertise and co-ordinating role in what was now a "real and urgent crisis" should be used to make the most of national efforts.

But the allies are realistic on the West's involvement in nuclear weapons control. While some Soviet republics have already acknowledged they will need outside advice, there is no suggestion that NATO governments will get close to the heart of the Soviet nuclear weapons machine.

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said it was crucial to avoid a power vacuum. Recognising the new Soviet republics' independence should be linked in some way to dismantling nuclear weapons. He and Mr. Hogg warned that the latest agreements on reductions in conventional weapons, signed but not ratified, must not be lost in the break-up of the Soviet bloc.

Arriving for the talks, Mr. Baker said he was reassured by his meetings in Moscow and the various republics. But NATO was facing challenges in helping with the smooth transfer of power. This afternoon the ministers were continuing talks on logistical help with humanitarian aid and assessing priorities and distribution. Britain is already contributing 20 million pounds sterling worth of animal feed, particularly in the north-west of the Soviet Union.

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